book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis
This is a series of essays by Generals and military people who were with the Chinese people 's volunteers. There is, unfortunately, not alot which is new here. A lot of the book emphasizes logistics, but on this score you may enjoy reading Charles Schrader's book Communist logistics in the Korean War which is more analytical and has far les of the ideological baggage woven in with the text.
According to Bin Yu, Stalin used Korea becuase he was concerned about China, not the USA. China's hasty intervention in North Korea worked well in the northwest [where the US 8th army was routed at Kunu Ri]; but in the east was really a disaster: the author heaps praise on the 1st Marine division. There was tremendous pressure from civilian leaders back in China and the USSR to achieve 'quick victory.' UN Air operations made Korea different from the Chinese civil war: food, clothing, shelter and materiel were desroyed so the peasant soldiers could not resupply themselves from the land as they hoped. The fifth campaign --both impulses-- was a disaster.
Marshall Pen Dehaui's story is worthless ideological spew. He is speaking to history, not on behalf of his soldiers. What a pity: there is no mention of the savage cold near Chosin and and how it wreaked havoc with his attack plans; no words from his mouth about how his frozen Legions (as Fehrenbach would call them) performed so well, given the circumstances. He does, grudgingly, mention his army's poor equipment and logistics.
Marshall Nie Rongzhen continues the ideological pap. His essay is tiresome, uninformative, and provides little detail. The Chinese rotation plan in 1952 improved the supply situation and enabled new soldiers to gain field experience. Rongzhen's comments on logistics vary from the informative ("ship food to regions, rather than to units") to worthless ("soldiers uniforms should be neither to thin nor too thick").
Lieutenant General DuPing's essay was a refreshing change. He felt that China would win in korea for two sets of reasons. Militarily, they had superior numbers (4 million); greater morale from a clear mission; better logistics because they were adjacent to korea while the US was across the pacific; God and justice was on their side; and DuPing assigned zero probability to a nuclear strike: he knew it would never work in a country already devastated and as rural as Korea was.
On the political side, initially commanders overestimated US Soldiers willingness to fight (I am sure that disappeared after Kunu Ri); chinese soldiers were more politically indoctrinated to fight (the Campaign to Resist Amerika and Assist Korea, or CRAAK: readers of this website will see me refer to these soldiers occasionally as CRAAK Babies); there was a propoganda victory gained in their initial treatment and release of POW's (example was T.F. Drysdale near the Chosin); and the chinese were encouraged to respect the local Korean peasantry.
Hong Xeushi commented on logistics. Like DuPing, he felt the Chinese soldiers felt their's was a just cause. His soldiers were combat hardened and used to hardships at home and in the field. They were mobile and flexible, running ridges and hillsides with ease. Chinese soldiers were able to carry more than their US counterparts and mad ebetter use of trucks and waggons. One aspect which hurt was the UN tactic of a 'no-grain- area between the 38th and 37th parallel, starving the Chinese troops hoping to forage in the fields.
Xiang Quian faced the difficult task of securing materials from the Russians, who not only distrusted the Chinese (fearing Titoism from their massive neighbor) but also wished to play the game of "let's you and him fight.' Told they would would provide enough materials for 16 division, in the event enough for 10 was provided. The Russian's stonewalled on expanding China's defense industries. Of course, China didn't know about many of Russia's problems. Russia had big-country/superpower arrogance (wow, i thought that was just an american trait!); many of the rifles and equipment they supplied was inferior. He might have added that Russia never provided the promised air support, either.
Yang Dezhi emphasized the concept of mobility in the Chinese defense, which included the massive tunnels and 'cats ear' shelters used to protect their forces and allow them to observe the enemy. They were immune from bombing and were invaluable at the battle of Shanggangling, which Mr. Dezhi apparently feels was as meaningful a turning point for the Chinese as Chipyong'ni was for the UN forces.
Chai Chong'wens' article on the Truce negotiations started out with a good description of the participants and early issues like the number of reporters and other early snafus. Of the five issues in the talks, items (1) thru (3)--agenda, demarcation line, and armistice details-- went quite smoothly. Much less is said on the repatriation issue, which is unfortunate since it tied up the talks for so long; all Chong'wen has to say is that 'thousands of communists refused to be repatriated because they were spies.' Issue (5), the post armistice politcal conference on Korea, was largely a non-event by the time it took place, anyway. Still, the negotiations were so complex that it would have been better if Chong'wens' article were either omitted completely, or given the massive treatment and deatil it deserved, much akin to a separate text like Turner Joys How Communists Negotiate .