book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis
Now look, I will be honest with my readers. A book like this gets my dander up right at the start, and that is going to colour the entire review of this book. If Weintraub wants to spend alot of time talking about MacArthur's military blunders, thats fine. But if this turns out to be a kiss-and-tell book about his Tokyo palace guard, that's an entirely different story.
In the first few exasperating chapters, thats exactly what this book is. Sure, there is new stuff--word that Stalin pulled Red Army advisers back from NKPA forward units in the days before the attack--but such tidbits are overwhelmed by carping about the 'shogunate in Tokyo.' Of course..MacArthur had his colony of admirers and his princely court in Japan. But pray tell, exactly what did Acheson, or Truman, or the JCS have around themselves in Washington? Right under Acheson's nose was a diplomatic establishment infested with spies and half hearted allies. What about Acheson's legendary arrogance and contempt for those less purebred than himself? How many lives did that cost? If Weintraub is gonna sling arrows at MacArthur's comments in a rambling chat with Sulzberger, please lets have all the rants and rambles of Truman and Acheson similarly dissected.
Its odd doing this review. I am not a defender of MacArthur; its just that Weintraub's carping is so annoying I want to switch sides just this once. Consider the decision MacArthur made to "take out NK airfields." Obvious insubordiniation!, claims Weintraub. But then again, in the next sentence, we get "hot pursuit was an accepted doctrine." And futhermore, the Pentagon and Truman rubber stamped the commander's field decision. So who is to blame? In what way is it arrogant, pompous, or inappropriate for a field commander to fill the void left by men such as Truman and Acheson? MacArthur has lives to save. Is his concern about a Presidential future any less respectable than Truman's concern about congressional elections? Was it MacArthur, or Truman, who staged the Wake conference? Who saw it for the dog-and-pony show that it was? Many American voters that fall of 1950 would kill for the chance to treat Truman with the contempt MacArthur did at Wake Island. (They did a pretty good job with their fingers on the voting machine levers one month later). Is it any less contemptuous for MAcArthur to take credit for "promptly ordering the destruction of bridges" than it is for Truman to try and bask in the glow of an In'chon landing his very own JCS tried their damned hardest to circumvent?
Of course not. Thats not what MAcArthur deserves to be criticized for, but heck, its the style of journalism these days. So is the cult of personality, especially media personalities. Weintraub, like Toland in his book Mortal Combat, has a fixation on Maggie Higgins. In some stretches of the book--the In'chon landings, for example-- you know more about the movements of Maggie Higgins than you do about the movement of Marine Units. Apparently a victory for feminoid journalism is more important than a victory at high tide. Now that we have secured South Korea from ravages of the NKPA, should we continue the offensive and cross the parallel? Wait..wait...there is more important stuff to talk about in chapter 9...Maggie Higgins crawled out of a foxhole looking "tall, blonde and ugly!" Interesting sense of priorities, Mr. Weintraub.
Lest you think I will detest this entire book, you are mistaken. It takes a marked turn for the better in later chapters. I like Weintraub for really emphasizing the loss of momentum after In'chon caused by MacArthur's decision to pull the MArines off the line and send them all the way around the Peninsula for a landing at Wonsan. Weintraub avoids the trap of suggesting that UN forces crossing the parallel was some kind of heinous international crime of epic porportions. Similarly, he makes clear the Chinese decision to intervene in Korea had sound military logic--terrain, style of warfare, proximity-- it was not just some ideological campaign.
MAcArthur's blunder(s) of course, were in this stage of the war. His belief that the Taebek mountains were of no significance in force deployment flew in the face of the knowledge he should have had about the mobility of Chinese forces. Distrust the the comments of front-line soldiers: but when NKPA officer Lee Hak Ku 'surrenders' to gullible analysts, swallow his plea hook line and sinker! Send him to Cheju-do, and watch him lead the Koje uprisings. The extent of naivete about communist methods throughout the US establishment nwas staggering; and provided ample cannon fodder for Senator MacArthy's committees, whatever might be true about the latters style.
The misgivings and annoyance of Ridgway with MacArthur stand in sharp contrast to the carping comments of Acheson and others. Even before the trap put out by Peng was sprung, Ridgway did not see the move back north by UN forces as a 'resumption of an offensive.' To him it was a 'advance to contact:' you can't attack an enemy whose positions are not known! Ridgway would repair the damage done by MacArthur's blunders over the first few months of 1951. It was Truman, Acheson and the JCS who blundered the war for another two years, often rebuking Ridgway in the process. How many lives did that cost?
In the hysteria that surrounded the Chinese rout in north korea, Weintraub keeps a strong analytical eye. MacArthur sure did overreact. The nuclear option
was bandied about constantly, but it ulitmately was dismissed for the two bet reasons. First: there wasn't a target in north Korea that merited nuclear bombing. (Heck most targets barely merited conventional bombing by this time!). And second, nukes are a poor option unless you are desparate. Not only was the situation in Korea not desparate, as Ridgway proved, but for the UN to appear desparate against a rag-tag army of Chinese peasants would destroy the entire credibility of the west and its nuclear umbrella. Not until smaller, 'tactical' nukes were developed and deployed later in 1953 were nukes an 'option.'
In any case, now we do see MacArthur at his imperial worst. Taking credit to Ridgway's offensives, photo opportunities which betray UN intentions to the enemy. In this part of the book, Weintraub is on far better ground. The complaints are coming from one military commander (Ridgway) about another. And MacArthur wanders far beyond the boundaries of his theatre and his task as General, courting diplomats in Spain and Portugal!!! The letter to congressman Martin was a last straw. Such sweeping analysis and decisions about use of military force is strictly the province of the President, his closest advisors, and (theoretically) congress; though that last body had ceded its role in June 1950. These final chapters of the book are nowhere near as infuriating or controversial as the earlier sections; then again, Weintraub offers little here which is new. MacArthur fades away on closer examination; and on closer examination, so should this book.