book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis
I WANT TO USE THE title of this book to contrast Mortal Combat, which is what war is all about, with Mortal Kombat, which is what Clintonesque left wing radicals think it is all about. To be fair, the Pentagon did not help matters much with its 'videos of missiles going thru store windows' in Desert Storm. Some blame goes to Hollywood's celluloid warriors, who have been trying sanitize battle for decades, and the Air Force, which thinks war consists of flyboys doing a few afternoon sorties and returning in time for dinner at the Officers club. I once met an editor who claimed he could decide if a book was suitable for publication after reading just three pages. I must state a concurring opinion. The early pages-- preface, contents, organization of a book-- are critical indicators of the quality which follows. In this sense, Tollands book does a good job, stating a few questions about the Korean War he will attempt to answer. Some questions he answers:
Despite this mixed start, the book is a good chronology of the War and adds some detail not seen in other texts. His coverage of the battles in the east of Korea--Yechon, Taegu-- and the heroism of Private Myers are unique. Readers of Knox's books will recognize names, battles, and terrain of the Pusan perimeter; Tollands narrative is more detailed and analytical.
With respect to the Inchon landing, Toland also enlightens the reader. The Chinese told Kim Il Sung to expect and amphibious assault at that time and place (perhaps they read the NY Times, also?) but the 'great leader' was quite convinced his In-Min Gun would have the war wrapped up by then. Toland warms the heart of this former collegiate debater when he points out that McArthur skillfully accused critics of his Inchon landing of opposing any amphibious assault. Furthermore, General Walker felt at the time, and speculated even more later in the War and in the book, that the Inchon landing might have been a technical success but a tactical failure: it was too far behind enemy lines. Many enemy remained south of the parallel and harassed UN supply routes.
Another contribution Toland makes: everyone on the ground was wondering why the Chinese 'disappeared' into the hills after their initial assaults in early November. Some felt it was a warning from the Chinese, and having made their point, they vanished. Wrong: it was a tactic by Mao to exploit McArthur's overconfidence. UN forces indulged the Chinese premier by marching northward into the trap.
Other than these the authors' narratives and outlook on the war and negotiations closely resemble other authors. I do have a final question for Toland: is Maggie Higgins your fantasy or something?? For the first third of the book or so, Maggie Higgins makes more cameo appearances than Ted Kennedy at an IRA fundraiser.