book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis
This is a good book. The introduction sets the tone and the theme for the book, and since you know where the author is coming from right off the bat, it hangs together despite being one of those books which covers the battles of the war in numbing detail. His theses are several:
From the beginnning Korea was a weak neighbor caught between the rapidly chilling cold war and power politics in eastern asia. The occupation of Korea by Russian and US forces at the end of WWII was without any specifics..that hurt as relations between the two nations hardened. Both occupying forces were heavyhanded. The Russians used reform to calm things down, but the south was in chaos among its political factions. The US, wishing to wash its hands of korea, turned to the UN as a way to have peninsular elections, though the north refused to take part. Some economic improvement took place in the south as 1950 approached, helped by ruthless suppression of insurrections by Syghman Rhee in the central mountains of Korea.
There is lengthy discussion of how an asia war would detract from the European theatre, as well as hurt China. There was a palpable sense of doom on both sides, though in fact USA, China and Russia had profound reasons NOT to go to war in those summer days of 1950: after the attack, early diplomatic moves made it clear that the 3 superpowers would be the ones to decide Korea's fate.
It is also clear that discussion about going over the 38th parallel were underway in the US as early as the 10th of August, in a speech by Austin. Stueck talks about ways a status quo ante bellum in September might have been doable, though he never addresses the American argument that we could be 'bled dry' by always having to merely push back Bloc forces: communist insurgencies all over the globe gave the Russians far more flexibility.
The In'chon landing of course changed the momentum of the war; now it was the Russian initiatives to slow down allied progress and momentum for treaties and the NATO alliance. Stueck correctly points out that military events occurred so quickly those first few months in Korea that they overwhelmed diplomatic processes. Stalin was now in Truman's position three months earlier...his ally trashed, his influence on the line. Given US and Chinese reservations about the course of events, it is a pity they did not talk directly to one another; they might have reached some sort of agreement. Still...how to 'reunite' North with South korea would remain problematic.
One problem with Stueck which makes the book fun to read, but difficult to learn from and summarize, is that he spends vast amounts of time trying to divine the intentions of the combatants. But this was part of the emotional rollercoaster of the era: NKPA arrogance in July; American invincability in October; Chinese stubborness in early 1951. He does not do as good a job conveying the sense of doom, of imminent global war, that swept washington in early december as [XXXXX] does, however.
The spring of 1951 brought much progress, in the field with Ridgway's offensives and restoration of Army battle confidence, and on the diplomatic front, with a Japanese peace treaty, NATO membership and German re-armament all firmly in place. I might add that the Marshall Plan and Japanese economic recovery were also well under way.
The peace talks were a struggle between the UN side, which wanted only military issues discussed, and the Chinese, who wanted discussions to include much broader issues. It was not easy for anyone: China had as much contempt for the nationalist Kim as America did for Rhee. Where to fix the truce line was an initial test of each sides backbone. The break in negotiations was designed to pressure the US on its treaty with Japan: it backfired. That treaty, NATO settlement and some failed offensives made the russians lose on 3 major points. In fact the communist side often found, later as well, that suspending negotiations was not in their interest: it denied them a valuable propaganda platform. Stuecks' coverage of the airfields,surveillance, and POW repatriation issues is disjointed--granted the talks were going on simultaneously, but they can still be treated separately. The repat issue was, singly, well treated: there would be difficulty with German and Japanese POW's still held by the Russians. In some ways, each side had a vested interest in a prolonged stalemate: The US continued european rearmament; China coninued to train its army; Russia continued to bleed the US.
Stueck concludes that the death of Stalin, operation little switch, and the cost of advancing to the 'neck' of Korea pushed the USA and the communists back to the negotiating table. Russia was having problems with its eastern European satellites--the initial tremors of the Hungary 1956.
In his aftermath chapter, the author returns to his thesis that korea was a proxy for WWII between the US and Russia. Did korea prevent a far greater crisis in Europe? Did it prevent an attack--well planned-- against Yugoslavia in 1951??
What about the great men? How did they fare? Kim Il Sung, who assumed the war would be over in days, became as much a puppet of the Chinese as Rhee ever was for the USA. MacArthur thought we would be home by Christmas but got an early summons before Easter. Mao's fantasy that hungry masses could overwhelm western technology died an early, miserable death with millions of his soldiers. Stalin fostered China's dependency on the USSR but now faced an armed and developing Europe. As for Truman, his establishing voluntary repatriation became his legacy.
What about those great ideas and ideologies? China obtained immense prestige, strutting its stuff at conferences in Geneva and Bandung; but its liberal economy gave way to stalinist style planning; and they distrusted the Russians ever more. The USA was now firmly identified, in Asia, as an ally of European colonial powers; still, at least our allies prospered and set an example to developing countries. The UN didn't set too firm an example for collective action; few countries really took part. Nor could it resolve great disputes between the powers. It did, however, encourage Russia to stay engaged with the organization since its governing bodies were so vital.