Roughstuff's Korean War Archive
book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis
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Stanton, Shelby L. America's Tenth Legion
X Corps in Korea, 1950 DS 919 S72 1989

This book is of markedly different flavor and style from many of the books I have reviewed on this site. It focuses heavily on the character strengths and weaknesses of General Edward Almond and how these played a large role in X corps performance in Korea---especially in X corps disaster near Chosin. I never feel comfortable reviewing books like this; I have been taught to believe that 'ideas, not people' are right and wrong. All this 'loyalty' stuff sticks in my gut, which is probably why i never could have made it in the military! In any case, it was this loyalty Almond had to MacArthur which led the latter to pick Almond to prepare X-corps for an amphibious landing at Inchon; MacArthur needed a yes man...as if he didn't have enough around him. To be fair to both men, it is also true that Inchon could only succeed if you believed it would succeed...loyalty and faith would be needed to wade thru a basically conservative and uncreative Joint Chiefs of Staff, who already were letting MacArthur walk over them, anyway. Still, it was only a matter of time before Almonds lack of combat experience--and his racism-- took their toll. On the one hand Almond decided not to march X corps across the peninsula to Wonsan 'because he saw firsthand how the NKPA defended the high ground.' On the other he sat back and let MacArthur push him into the Chosin, where the surrounding peaks are twice as high and remote. You have to wonder if the entire X corps would have been lost if Marine General Smith hadn't dragged his feet up Funchilin pass and insisted a runway be built at Hagaru-ri.

While Stanton's discussion of Inchon is pretty typical, he does add that the limited and outdated armaments provided by the Russians was a factor in Chromite's success. Inchon was not much of a test of Almond's mettle, since he was either directly under MacArthur's wing, or Admiral Struble's during the amphibious phase of the assault.

Stanton describes the bottlenecks caused by moving the marines from Seoul, around the peninsula by boat to Wonsan harbor, which was mined by the Russians. Japanese crews helped clear the mines, actions that could have had pretty substantial international repercussions if they had been captured or discovered. Army personnel and materiel returning to Pusan clogged the woefully inadequate South Korean rail and road system, in addition to falling prey to isolated bands of snipers and guerrillas. Once the army and marines had landed they encountered scattered guerilla groups in North Korea. Meanwhile, ROK units fought pitched battles with Chinese soldiers: the first, ominous warnings of Chinese intervention.

There is a good description in this book of why MacArthur wanted to advance to the Yalu, comparing it with the Italian peninsular campaign. The thirst for infantry units to march northward was insatiable, stripping posts of Puerto Ricans on the Panama Canal and "less desireable, especially black" soldiers elsewhere. Almond was firmly convinced integration would weaken military efficiency.

Almonds two Army division commanders--David Barr and Robert Soule-- had personally witnessed the Chinese civil war and should have known the Chinese were accomplished cold weather, mountain fighters and marchers. US forces were stunned to see Chinese soldiers wearing sneakers. Chinese weapons, chain of command, and tactics differed markedly from the NKPA.

The army disaster east of the Chosin reservoir was due to a communications breakdown that 'bordered on command criminal negligence;' with inadequate radios, and failure to share frequencies or intelligence data. It was largely due to the constant rivalry between Marine and Army commands in X corps.

In summary, Almond was compelled to follow MacArthurs order: the real strategic blunders were made in Tokyo. But Almond shares the blame also: his loyalty robbed him of independent judgement (the whole problem with loyalty in any institution, when loyalty is to people, not principle. So fuck you military guys!). His prejudices against nonwhite soldiers in the Polyglot, multiracial X-corps affected his command. The Army justified Almonds failures--in WWII and Korea--by blaming black troops: "if Almond can't get them to fight...nobody can." In his defense Stanton mentions that Almonds' constant visits to the front lines maintained functional effectiveness of the corps during the frigid North Korean winter conditions.



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