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The Chosin Reservoir Battles

Marines lay in the snow on the MSR, Nov.29 1950

Analyses and descriptions of the Chosin Campaign generally break into 2 categories. Some authors (such as Knox) talk about the battles in isolation, with little reference to the machinations of State and McArthur's headquarters that led to the final decisions on troop deployment. So do many sites by marines, of which Sgt. Grit might be quite typical: The Chosin Campaign, sniffs an anonymous jarhead on this Marines's site, began November 27 at Yudam-ni with the Communist Chinese action against the 5th and 7th Marine regiments...." While the line has to be drawn somewhere it must surely be drawn much further back in both time and miles. "X" corps did exactly beam down to the Chosin, even if there was rather unintelligent life at the command center which sent them there. Other authors, such as Applemans Escaping the Trap place the Chosin campaign in a far more useful context, and serve the dual purpose of enabling the reader to smell the disaster before it happened as well as endure it while it took place. For the near entrapment of the Marines and the 25RCT (The Army's 'Task Force Faith') was the result of stupidity as sheer as frozen mountain walls along the MSR those subzero nights in early December. Even given a healthy dose of skepticism about Monday Morning Quarterbacking 50 years later, the fact remains that sending army units (already demonstratably poor in training)and marine units (deeply suspicious about overwhelming Chinese presence in the surounding highlands) onto a narrow defile in the rapidly approaching winter weather seems absolutely incomprehensible. Keep in mind that I, Roughstuff, am not a military analyst nor a former military member so I say this not only with my own words, but take refuge in the conclusions of others far more knowledgeable on these matters. You don't have to listen to me when authors like Shelby Stanton blame communications breakdowns in Army units that bordered on command criminal negligence as reponsible for Task Force Faith's annihilation.



I prefer to tell the entire story of the Chosin on this page as well as provide links along the way. In this fashion you can enjoy my description and writing style in addition to, if you wish, jumping to other books and authors for reference. Many of my readers are familiar with the basic context and chronology of the Korean War; many are not. This dual format, traditional on the internet, can successfully navigate the waters betwen the two. In fact it is the internet's great strength as a communications medium.

As long as US (lets abolish the rhetorical myth it was a 'UN" force, right from the start, ok??) forces were fighting the Korean war over that part of the terrain which can be considered the 'Peninsula' (basically, due south of a line from Anju to Hungnam in North Korea) standard Pacific (Marine) military doctrine could and did apply. As soon as we recovered from the initial shock of the NKPA attack, US forces coalesced (shakily) in the Pusan Perimeter. But as Knox points out in his book Pusan to Chosin, for once US forces had interior zones of communications and "both flanks anchored to the sea." The In'chon landings, classic peninsular warfare, turned the tides (no pun intended) of the war within days and within two months the same communists who had knocked on the doors at Pusan heard the US forces at the doorstep of their Red Chinese strongholds. I am reminded, being a fan of J.R.R. Tolkien, of his rendition of the Nirnaeth Arnoediad, the elves doomed and agonizing fight against Morgoth in the Silmarillion

By ill chance, at that point in the outworks stood Gwindor of Nargothrond, the brother of Gelmir. Now his wrath was kindled to madness, and he leapt forth on horseback, and many riders with him; and they pursued the heralds and slew them, and drove on deep into the main host. And seeing this all the host of the Noldor was set on fire, and Fingon put on his white helm and sounded his trumpets, and all the host of Hithlum leapt forth from the hills in sudden onslaught. The light of the drawing of the swords of the Noldor was like a fire in a field of reeds; and so fell and swift was their onset that almost the designs of Morgoth went astray. Before the Army that he had sent westward could be strengthened it was swept away, and the banners of Fingon passed over Anfauglith and were raised before the walls of Angband. Ever in the forefront of that battle went Gwindor and the Elves of Nargothrond, and even now they could not be restrained; and they burst through the Gate and slew the guards upon the very stairs of Angband, and Morgoth trembled upon his deep throne, hearing them beat upon his doors. But they were were trapped there, and all were slain save Gwindor only, whom they took alive; for Fingon could not come to their aid. By many secret doors from Thangorodrim Morgoth had let issue his main host that he held in waiting, and Fingon was beaten back with great loss from the walls.

Then in the plain of Anfauglith, on the fourth day of the war, there began the Nirnaeth Arnoediad, Unnumbered Tears, for no song or tale can contain all its grief.


Shame on you if you are so illiterate as to not understand that Nirnaeth Arnoediad was Elvish for "Unnumbered Tears". A better two word description of Chosin has yet to be found.

Indeed, so did the US forces rush forth in onslaught. Vast sections of south Korea were bypassed or left to local wimpy constabulary forces (The Chiri mountains; the Taebeks south and east of Wonju) to be 'cleaned out.' North Korean soldiers and sympathizers disappeared into the hills as partizans. Spilling over the 38th parallel ('not a strategic consideration in the deployment of my forces,' sniffed McArthur), reaching the Yalu seemed to be some sort of military entitlement program.

Enuff drama, Mama! Lets get back to the nitty gritty. The original plan, following the successful In'chon landing, was to withdraw the marines from the fight (awkward task for the marines, to break contact with a fleeing enemy. More about this in the near future) and ferry them around the peninsula to the east coast for embarakation near Wonsan. Their original task was to cut across the peninsula and join the remaining forces to capture Pyongyang. But logistic difficulties slowed their departure from In'chon, and mines slowed their arrival in Wonsan. By the time the Marines landed not only had Pyongyang fallen in the west, but the ROKs--no less kindled to madness than our Elvish friends in my earlier tale-- had rushed up the coast and captured Wonsan. To boot the Marines had missed Bob Hope and his endless jokes about extra pairs of Lips. Perhaps not in Love, but in War all is unfair.



With the changing situation on the ground, plans for "X" corps were revised and rewritten. Its task became to march north, with the army units proceeding along the coast and the marines inland toward the Chosin. Only after the Marines had occupied the terrain East of Chosin (I capitalize the term out of deference to Applemans book by the same title) were the Army units--young, untrained in cold weather warfare and with questionable leadership-- called upon to replace their positions.

Those poor devils from the 31st and 32nd Infantry came to me to get liners for their parkas and other equipment. "Look," I said, "we have only one parka per man ourselves." I warned them: "now see here, don't go out on a limb out there. Take it easy."
USMC Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith

Donald Faith, the doomed leader of the task force of the same name, barely had time to scurry from the coast of North Korea--sometimes by hitching rides-- to reach the assigned units. They had not even reached regimental strength before they were placed, like the little frozen ducks they soon were to be, in a string of isolated posts centered on the Pyongnuri-Gong Inlet. So what if a reconnaisance platoon sent up that same inlet just, um, well, 'disappeared?' In contrast the the orderly--if, admittedly, still tragic-- withdrawal by the marines, the wholesale disintegration of Task Force Faith surely is the umbra in the dark shadow the US Army's performance during the Korean War.



A map of the Chosin from Knox's book Pusan to Chosin shows the Reservoir as well as any...enough detail of the terrain to make the discussion meaningful, general enough to allow you to see instantly the pickle US forces found themselves in. Chinese attacks east of the reservoir actually began somewhat further north of the highlighted place on the map: Pyongnuri-gang (say that ten times fast) Inlet is the large bay trending northeastward from the reservoir. Draining into it is the river whose defile is the very one where Faith's recon platoon disappeared. This early in the season the Chosin would be frozen reliably solid only in these inner bays; the main reservoir would have open water and did, at the time of the campaign. The map that I have now-- a large map of North Korea with adjacent Manchuria and Russia compiled in 1994 by the Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center in St. Louis, Missouri-- no longer shows a road branching west out of Hagaru-ri over Toktong pass to Yudam-ni. (Which is very odd, because there is one...it is even marked on some maps as NK 72!) Yudam-ni was the northernmost point the Marines reached. Again, the original (revised) plan became for the Marines to march west and north eventually to link up with the Army Units on the west coast. Even today this route remains an unpaved, remarkably sinuous road through spine of central North Korea. At that time it would have been knee deep in snow and Chinese. I add all this because I have to wonder--in awe, perhaps in disgust, even fifty years later-- just what could have possessed the leaders in Tokyo to think that such a campaign was possible.

This is on top of my other, earlier overriding objection: that, once north of Hamhung (in the east...in the west it was Anju) the Korean peninsula 'ceases to exist' as such and becomes the "Asian" mainland...ya know, the one the JCS warned us about (repeatedly after WWII). We were making the same mistakes here as we had suffered much further south. First, the flanks the Marine and Army units were not interconnected and most certainly did not anchor to the sea. Second, units no longer had interior lines of communication/transportation. The MSR was it; and forces were lucky, thanks to Marine discipline and air support, that they were able to control the portions of the road needed as the retreat proceeded.


This campaign in North Korea was novel insofar
as the Marine Corps was concerned. It was mountain
warfare and we had not been particularly trained for it.

In fact, mountain warfare under such bitter cold conditions were largely unknown to US forces. No major US wars have been fought in such a cold climate. All the more reason for us to attack and annex Canada (just kidding).

The Chosin of course is known for its triumphs as well as its tragedies, and four events in particular highlight the agonies of the battle. They are

I will add text in due time but for now I will refer my website readers to Applemans book Escaping the Trap for the first and last two of this series. Of the four many readers may be least familiar with task Force Drysdale. When it became clear that Hagaru would be under siege from Chinese troops and that units retreating from the Chosin might need more firepower to fight their way southward, a task force of tanks and infantry were sent north, from Koto-ri, as reinforcements. The Chinese attacked the column en masse, breaking units apart at several places. Some were decimated in what later was called Hell-fire valley; others turned back to Koto. Only a small portion made it to Hagaru. Its help was invaluable in the return southward.

More readers are likely to be familiar with the rescue of the Marines at Fox hill: one of the few times units deployed overland, even by night. The construction of the trestle bridge, by which time the spirits of the Hungnam-bound forces had begun to lift, was creative engineering at its best. Again less attention has been focused, over the years, on the vital role that air support--both attack and supply-- played in assuring the campaign drew to a successful close. The runway built at Hagaru to evacuate casualties ("What casualties?" sniffed General Walker when USMC General Smith suggested the idea) also brought fresh troops in from Japan. What such air support might have meant to Task Force Faith (which had no radio contact with pilots or even its adjacent units) is grist for somber speculation.

To learn the entire story about the decimation of Task Force Faith at hill 221, you must turn to Appleman's other book, East of Chosin. Cuddle up in a warm place by the fire if you are reading it this winter. It may make you cold. It will probably also make you angry. It will most certainly make you sad:

On the morning of December 2, as he flew away from the Chosin Reservoir, for the last time, General Hodes must have felt a deep sense of failure and heartache about his efforts to serve his 7th Infantry Division troops and comrades east of Chosin.

Roy E. Appleman



More text is being added to this section. Check back every few weeks.