Asia breathes a sigh of relief. Right? Regional tensions can at last be reduced. Right? America's postwar presence in Japan and Korea finally bears fruit. Right?
Wrong, on all counts. A unified Korean peninsula will increase, not decrease military and economic tensions in Northeast Asia, at least in the short term. Unification could even set off an arms race with devastating impact on the regions' long term stability.
A united Korea could rapidly become a major Asian and world economic power. South Korea alone already has the worlds 11th largest GDP, boasting per capita income in excess of $10,000 in 1996. It manufacturing based export economy would benefit tremendously from access to natural resources which the North possesses in abundance: 80% of the peninsula's iron ore, lead, zinc and tungsten are in the North. So are numerous underutilized hydropower sites. Its labor force, though unskilled, would provide a welcome antidote to the South's rapidly climbing wage costs.
Similar arguments were made for Germany after the Berlin Wall fell. But the circumstances are completely different. Korean unification is viewed as inevitable and is already actively being prepared for; German unification occurred suddenly. The Koreans are keenly aware of the economic and political changes unification will bring; Germans and Europeans were starry eyed with the end of the cold war. Nor is the Korean central bank likely to repeat the Bundesbanks' foolish policy of exchanging Deutschmarks for wooden-nickel Ostmarks, which set off a bout of inflation and induced a recession. Does anyone really believe the North Korean Won is worth the official rate of $2.50? North Korea's labor force is not only highly literate, but highly disciplined as well. North Koreans have been fed the doctrine of Juche, or self reliance through individual effort; East Germany's labor force was trained to expect security and lifetime employment from its socialist nanny state. Finally, Korea is located in a dynamic, rapidly growing region with high savings and entrepreneurial spirit. Germany still bears the deadweight of social insurance schemes and eurostagnation.
A united Korea would use its new power and influence to become more assertive and proactive in world political and economic affairs, especially versus the Japanese. South Korea's primary concern has always been its ailing northern neighbor. Even so, it has found time to bloody Japan's nose on a number of occasions. The recent world cup football bidding is only one example. The Korean government's decision in 1992 to award a high speed railway contract to a European consortium rather than Japan's Mitsubishi is another. Korea was quick to exploit Japan's strengthening Yen and already has substantial production facilities in Mexico and Europe. In 1995 they displaced the Japanese as world leaders in the production of memory microchips. By volume Korea is the world's fifth largest auto manufacturer. Auto industry executives have announced bold plans for expansion, doubling sales and exports by the year 2000.
A unified Korea would most likely align itself with the Chinese politically and economically. Both maintain authoritarian capitalist economies. Both have suffered from Japanese aggression in this century. China's 500 year suzerainty is remembered with none of the bitterness which characterizes that of Japan's 40 year colonial rule. Korean politicians hyperventilate about their tarde deficit with Japan even more than American officials do. For its part, China would find Korea a welcome ally in Asia against American economic interests and influence. Indeed, China would be in a position to do what it has long cherished: exploit the different military and economic agendas of Japan and the Koreas, to America's disadvantage.
A unified Korea would pose a delicate threat to the region's military stability and balance of power. The military personnel and conventional materiel possessed by the new state would already be substantial. Furthermore, it is prudent to assume that the North Koreans possess nuclear weapons. Scientists disagree over exactly how much plutonium has been produced at Yongbyon; but estimates vary between 20 and 40 kilograms of nuclear material. This has led Bob Gates, CIA director in the Bush administration, to suggest it is already 'too late to stop the North Korean bomb.' Who will assume responsibility for this material after Korea unifies? In a clash between Japan, which would prefer the peninsula to remain non-nuclear, and Korea, for whom the materials would place in the elite club of nuclear nations, either way the US loses. Would Korea allow the US to remove these materials? Would the Japanese decide to develop an equivalent nuclear deterrent if they were not? It will be a major diplomatic challenge for America to balance these competing interests of its two allies.
Yet these problems would need to be resolved at a time when the primary raison d'etre for America's presence in Asia will have vanished. America has yet to clearly articulate its role in Asia in the 21st century beyond the Korean threat. We will regret this lack of foresight if the Chinese can diminish American credibility on the peninsula and in Japan at the same time. Ironically this would be over the issue of non-proliferation, a crown jewel in America's diplomatic strategy since World War II.
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