book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis
POW deaths in the Korean War staggered the imagination. 43% of US POWs died in captivity, the vast majority from starvation. 3000 deaths...in six months! Contrast that with 4% in German/Italian camps in WWII. 34% died in the Japanese camps...an ominous prognosis, given that our next war was in Asia. Only the Eastern Front between Russia and Germany saw greater percentages of POW deaths; again an ominous prognosis, for the Korean winters easily match those of the European Russia. Nor can we forget that US forces did not have winter clothing. Thus it is not surprising that in one death march to the Yalu only 38 of 59 civilians, and 280 of 650 enlisted personnel, survived. To be honest, neither the North Koreans nor the Chinese were prepared for such vast numbers of POWs.
Perhaps a lot of the problems began with a breakdown in discipline in the camps as the Chinese/NKs emphasized all prisoners were 'equal.' Nor were the Chinese interested in having prisoners be efficient workers (which would have given them exercise and mental stimulation). Their goals lay elsewhere: brainwashing, indoctrination. Prisoners were sorted into three groups: Progressives, middle-of-the-roaders, and reactionaries, depending on their willingness to cooperate with Maoist doctrine. Most prisoners took the middle path; hoping to do enough to stay alive, but not enough to help the enemy. Others were more cruel and opportunistic: 'Tiny' Floyd and James Gallagher draw special attention from the author.
Colonels Fleming and Liles 'tough love 'and 'being more concerned with keeping themselves and their men alive than in preserving honor and reputation' kept death rates down to 3%. It came down to simple concerns like use of latrines, cracking lice, and no endless chatter on lack of food. (For a more crusty comment on cracking lice and life in the POW camps, see 's "Camp V" reviewed elsewhere.) Lile's later plans to escape from camp 12 went for naught. Camp 12 was a huge propoganda engine for the communists; most of their publications and tapes were disseminated in 3rd world countries.
There is a good discussion of the practical difficulties presented by the old 'name rank and serial number' restriction on what POWs can say. 'It would be far beneficial to teach soldiers to do their best not to reveal militarily useful information' than to impose some ridiculous rule upon them. Under the name/rank principle, anyone who says more than that is a collaborator. Thus, soldiers might just go ahead and think, 'i've already collaborated...it doesn't matter what else I say now.' Chinese forces had US Army artillery and NCO manuals! 'It is difficult to expect American soldiers to hold back information about what was essentially common knowledge when doing so may cost them their lives.' They ignored the rule.
Things began to improve in 1952. Prisoners lists were exchanged, and more food was available as the Chinese realized that if deaths continued at the same pace as 1950-51, they soon would have no prisoners left. Frank Schwable's lengthy mental and physical abuse from August to December of that year made clear, however, that POWs still could be invaluable sources of propoganda. So too, were the 23 servicemen who refused to be repatriated to the US; Lech's description of their motives is informative.
The epilogue-where the author continues the saga and speculation about Korean War POWs 'still in bamboo cages'-shows the true colors of America's military bureaucracy and lays bare the façade of its concern for the well being of our men and women in uniform. Coming at a time (the war against terrorism after the WTC and Pentagon bombings) when Pentagon brass hide behind these same forces as heroes in Afghanistan, one can only hope that Americans will rediscover the healthy skepticism-and even contempt-for such bureaucrats in short order.