Roughstuff's Korean War Archive

book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis
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Kim, Myung-Ki. The Korean War and International Law.

This book is tough, pithy, difficult reading. Legalese, zillions of footnotes, some awkward use of English and poor translation, are likely to turn off readers not familiar with the nature of such documents. Futhermore, I was hoping for a braoder scope of issues to be addressed—for example, prisoner repatriation. Instead this is an informative, if highly specialized, analysis of the Korean War’s origins and conduct. The Armistice agreement and UN conference on the war in 1954 are also covered.

You will find the relevant text from the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, which resulted in a divided Korea after WWII. The 38th parallel became a dividing line between two nations as the Russians stopped interzonal communication and commerce with roadblocks, barbed wire. UNTCOK, created by the UN to solve these interregional disputes, failed as the Russians refused to even acknowledge them. The UN went ahead with elections in the South.

The author blames MacArthur, Acheson, and Senator Connelly for their statements that Korea was outside the sphere of influence of US. Connelly, speaking just days before the war began, went so far as to say the Russians could ‘take Korea at their convenience!’ I’ll grant the author his point but still: the fact remains that North Korea attacked because they felt it would be a three week romp to Pusan. But for the USMC at Naktong Bulge and Masan, it would have been.

Some claim the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27 were void because (1) Malik was not present, (2) the ‘real’ China was not on the council, and (3) The US had unilaterally responded with force. Kim does make clear that the UN lacks a ‘judicial branch’ which can interpret and measure the legality of its resolutions, much as our Supreme Court does. But Kim states that the Russia and China had accepted Security Council decisions before under similar circumstances. Did Russia’s absence constitute a veto? Theories are mixed but in practice it has not been viewed as a veto in the past. A veto is an ‘active’ choice; mere absence a more passive one. As for Chinese recognition, the choice of criteria for ‘recognizing’ a country is always at the discretion of (another) country, or organization. In more legalese Kim analyzes the UN’s basis for labeling the NK action as a ‘armed attack,’ a ‘breach of the peace,’ it’s ‘call’ for NK to cease hostilities, and its use of a ‘unified command.’ Please take the time to slug thru all this of you read the book. It is from attention to such detail that the moral underpinnings of War, and retaliatory action, are obtained.

Was Korea a civil war? Well, even if it was the UN could still intervene. Borders between states (such as Palestine, and Korea) expected to be ‘relatively permanent’ is an international war. What about the fact that NK was not a UN member? Well, the South had requested aid SK was a member. Furthermore, customary international law (not necessarily the powers of the UN) would require coming to SK’s aid. I must admit I got confused in the rest of the book, Chapter six and beyond. Distinctions between countries as a ‘belligerency,’ and ‘insurgency,’ an ‘aggressor,’ ad infinitum clogged up my brain a bit. I am going to put this book on the shelf and pick it up again sometime in the future, and continue this review.