Roughstuff's Korean War Book Reviews
page 4 of Roughstuff's reviews


Shrader, Charles Communist Logistics in the Korean War
DS 918 S515 1995

To an unschooled reader war consists of soldiers with small arms, artillery, air support and naval gunfire. Like all hasty generalizations, this one is misleading. Logistics: the science of delivering materiel in a timely fashion, is the unsung hero in many wars. By the way I say science of logistics: if you don't believe me pick up a graduate textbook on Linear Programming or Network Analysis. In any case, Shrader's book is a useful, if dry, explanation of communist logistics and the role this played in the korean war. Well illustrated, footnoted, with numerous charts and graphs, the book is an easier read than you might think.

The Korean climate and countryside imposed two important limitations on movement of materiel.

These two features, combined with the low quality and poorly maintained rail and roadway network, meant that the communists had to be creative and relentless in overcoming logistical obstacles.
Shrader breaks the Korean war into three periods, based upon the logistical factors that affected communist ability to fight sustain offensives. Neither North Korea nor China were in good enough shape to provide the In-min-gun with raw materials and industrial supplies: most heavy industrial/armaments came from the Soviet Union. The USSR used its leverage as a supplier to manipulate the Chinese and protect its wider geopolitical interests. [These interests were not so much a victory in Korea as an opportunity to bog down UN forces and distract attention from the European theatre.] Still the north had some internal production, left over from the Japanese factories; the NK's used alot of captured materiel, especially in the early part of the war. Local populations often were induced or forced to provide food and labor, sometimes compensated with 'rice notes' that could bused to pay taxes.

Communist soldiers carried only half as much as UN forces did; mostly less field equipment.
Shafer believes UN air-interdiction efforts turned the tides of the war very early on; after July 8, 1950 (at Chonan] convoys and troop trains could only move at night. By mid July serious shortages of food and medicine had limited effectiveness of NK forces. Despite the ballyhoo about the Manchurian sanctuary, the author suggests immunity of bases in China proved to be only a minor constraint. Nonetheless, summing up, the author makes clear that Air Force and Navy sorties prevented the UN from losing the war; but they could not 'win' it for UN forces. Interdiction never succeeded in 'isolating' communists on the front lines. By sheer persistence and creativity, a manageable amount of materiel reached their combat zones.

Acheson, Dean The Korean War
DS 918 A59 1971

Since Acheson writing is dense and his sphere of concern a large one, readers contemplating Acheson's Present at the Creation are well advised to read this short book, almost booklet, first. Keep in mind that Acheson was Secretary of State, a Democrat and a chief target of anti-communists of the era. Evan so, it is hard to believe he can make such pedantic remarks as

"so great was McArthur's luck [at Inchon] that typhoon Kieza... veered off to the east and communist spies were unable to put word thru to North Korea"
Oh come on! Operation 'Common Knowledge' had even been featured in the NY Times a few weeks before!

In any case Acheson starts the book with a solid discussion of Korea's history as a pawn of its neighbors: Japan, Russia and China. He maps out the rapid deterioration of relations with Russia after WWII to make clear to the reader the tensions prevalent in postwar Europe and Asia. Also gripping are his accounts of the hectic first week of the war, with the State and Defense departments swinging into action. He never deals with the issue of why, suddenly, the JCS and Truman decided to draw the line in Korea when only a few months before, they felt it was unnecessary. His argument that 'debate about a Declaration of War' would have done harm that desparate summer of 1950, seems specious given that the very issues such a debate would have resolved, soon were bloody blunders on the battlefield: crossing the 38th parallel; advancing to the Yalu; repatriation of prisoners. Modern readers, jaded with Vietnam as well as Korea, are likely to scoff at Acheson's puffery about 'the Presidency as a Sacred Trust:' it was Truman's obligation to hand it to future presidents with its 'powers untrammeled and weakened.' And what powers might those be, oh mighty ur-Secretary of State? Why, the power to send forces without congressional approval!

Acheson is strongest when he recalls events, rather than tries to interpret them. British and Indian initiatives were often comical. The early defeats focused attention on the sad state of our forces and led to almost panic-effort to rebuild our military readiness. Acheson admits, in a rare moment of humility, that the president's civilian and military advisors knew something was badly wrong in November 1950 but 'failed to serve him as he needed to be served." they should have suggested, even ordered, a withdrawal to the Pyongynang/Wonsan waist. They hesitated however, to tamper with a tradition since 1864, of not meddling with the theater commander.

Chinese intervention brought understandable panic and despair; but McArthur's tantrums and moods certainly did not help matters. Acheson states three 'fronts' had to be stabilized.

I still must focus on some Acheson inconsistencies with respect to the Panmunjom negotiations. He felt that 'removal of all foreign troops from Korea' was a political question 'unworthy of an armistice negotiation.' Hmmm....if so, just how is repatriation of prisoners not also a similar political no-no?? Acheson stuns me when he says it was the coming election, not repatriation, that held up negotiations for all those years. Not only does this contradict what Turner Joy and others close to the talks have said; it has an eerie self serving ring to it. Unable to blame anyone about the morass Acheson had gotten us into, he decided to blame posterity for our inability to get out.

Cotton, James and Neary, Ian The Korean War in History
DS 918 K566 1989

This is a collection of essays, proceedings of a conference held in Britain September 1985. As such it is not a chronology of the war and is best read by those who already have substantial grasp of the Korean War's phases, and the combatants involved.
Farrar-Hockley suggests that China was aware the Korean War would break out that summer of 1950, but did not plan to take an active part. America's seventh fleet in the Taiwan strait threw a host of Chinese plans into disarray: the Taiwan and Tibet invasions, concentrating on economic recovery after the civil war, etc. The Chinese intervention was designed primarily to push US forces from the border; the frenzied US withdrawal from NK was due primarily to General MacArthurs' political statements. On the other hand, Mao's hope that zealous soldiers would overcome western technology was tragically disproven ( are you listening, Saddam???). The Peoples Liberation Army lost confidence in him.

In contrast, Hak Joon-Kim suggests China was much less involved in the war than westerners think. Alot of information about 'Korean units in Chinese forces' came from Kuomintang sources playing to the US to get military support. These sources suggested it was part of Soviet expansionism since they wanted an asian equivalent to the Marshall/Kennan plan. North Korea's diplomatic, cultural, and scientific ties with China were weak; but strong with Russia. The NKPA was encouraged by China's defeat of the Kuomintang and received moral support, but not military. China returned NK soldiers to Manchuria and North Korea simply for economic reasons.

Gye Dong-Kim argues that, whatever ties Korea might have had with Russia, the Soviets saw the Korean War almost as the US saw it...a distraction from its European emphasis. Thus Kim argues the Russians would hardly approve; they even reduced the number of advisors in the country as war appoached. Much the same can be said for China: world sentiment was already beginning to shift toward allowing them into the UN. The Chinese had played a role in its preparation, but there is no evidence that they ordered or encouraged Kim Il-Sung to attack south. (Roughstuff comment: for further discussion of this 'who did what for whom' topic, see my Frequently Asked Questions section.)

Ra Jong-yil turned the conference's attention to the role played by the British. Britain had other porblems in Europe and with its economy, , so they let the US have a free hand in N.E. Asia. The Brits had a low opinion of US Statesmenship at the time ( the brits ALWAYS have a low opinion of another country's statesmenship...!): confusing nationalism with communism. The British felt the Korean were a very cruel people. (Again: for this recurring issue of the 'cruelty' of the Koreans, see my FAQs) In any case, the Brits intensely disliked Synghman Rhee and really preferred to have a new government once the peninsula was liberated. Of course, subsequent military events rendered thse concerns moot.

Peter Farrar asks a very specific question: Why wasn't a British proposal for a buffer zone on the Yalu never seriously considered? First, it was six weeks too late: forces were already north of the proposed zone, anyway. Also, why make territorial concessions before probing revealed Chinese intentions?? China never responded to furious backroom entreaties. Furhermore, China already had evidence that we would 'limit' the war: Yalu bridges, hot pursuit restrictions, etc. Farrar does not touch on the issue of spies (Philby, etc) in the Foreign Office. Again the Brits hoped the egomaniacal Rhee would be removed once elections were held. Reports of ROK atrocities in the attack north didn't make the British any more comfortable with him.

There are the usual conflicts about American vs British views of monolithic communism. The Brits not only disliked MacArthur for his vanity, but also for his criticism of America's Europe-first policy. In any case the British pushed as hard as they could to restrain rash US military moves and moods; but were themselves limited by the need to remain in alliance with the US. ( Donald McAllum's book on page 2 covers these issues in greater detail.)

More informative is M.L. Dockrill's discussion of the British perspective on the truce negotiations. Dockrill adds new material beyond Turner Joy's book as he focuses on several new points. A post-Korean war conference to settle larger Asian conflicts would be impossible due to thorny questions about China/Taiwan and the stubborness of US Republicans. The British and French chafed about lack of representation at the talks even though there forces were on the battlefield. Further, says Dockrill, the British had to realize that the US and Britain had fundamentally different spheres of interest. Britain was concerned with the Atlantic, Medittereanean, and Western Europe. The US was focused on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Artic oceans. Dockrill also makes clear there was plenty of conflicts between the Foreign Office and Churchill over prisoner repatriation. The major conflicts with the US came down to POWs (especially the proposal by India for a 3rd party of resolve repatriation) and whether China or Taiwan should be seated at the UN.

Reinhard Drifte focuses on the role played by the Japanese. Japanese nationals were used to a limited extent by UN forces. The bureaucratic elite was fervently anticommunist; it hid behind its veil of 'occupation' while it allowed the US to use bases to support the war. Japan relished the employment working at the bases provided. Operation Rollup, a post WWII salvageing of materiel scattered around the Pacific for maintenance and repair in Japan, provided crucial parts in the war's early stages. The US also used maps, place names, and information about Korea that had been assembled by the Japanese. This irked the Koreans no end.

Callum McDonald gives a solid description of communist/anticommunist cells in the POW camps and how this ferocious ideology led to the koje riots. 'The POW repatriation issue had global impact on the battle for the minds of men.' While it is tempting to suggest strict adherence to the original Geneva convention, forcible repatriation might have led to more violence, more riots, etc...

David Rees weaves the complex post WWII status of Japan into a pattern easily understood.The Russians, johnny-come-latelys to the Pacific war, played no role on the Far Eastern Commission that supervised Japanese occupation. After the war broke out Japan, already on its way to being considered an 'ally instead of a conquered enemy', quickly became part of a western pacific security alliance including Australia and New Zealand, its sovereignity restored.

Stanton, Shelby L. America's Tenth Legion
X Corps in Korea, 1950 DS 919 S72 1989

This book is of markedly different flavor and style from many of the books I have reviewed on this site. It focuses heavily on the character strengths and weaknesses of General Edward Almond and how these played a large role in X corps performance in Korea---especially in X corps disaster near Chosin. I never feel comfortable reviewing books like this; I have been taught to believe that 'ideas, not people' are right and wrong. All this 'loyalty' stuff sticks in my gut, which is probably why i never could have made it in the military! In any case, it was this loyalty Almond had to MacArthur which led the latter to pick Almond to prepare X-corps for an amphibious landing at Inchon; MacArthur needed a yes man...as if he didn't have enough around him. To be fair to both men, it is also true that Inchon could only succeed if you believed it would succeed...loyalty and faith would be needed to wade thru a basically conservative and uncreative Joint Chiefs of Staff, who already were letting MacArthur walk over them, anyway. Still, it was only a matter of time before Almonds lack of combat experience--and his racism-- took their toll. On the one hand Almond decided not to march X corps across the peninsula to Wonsan 'because he saw firsthand how the NKPA defended the high ground.' On the other he sat back and let MacArthur push him into the Chosin, where the surrounding peaks are twice as high and remote. You have to wonder if the entire X corps would have been lost if Marine General Smith hadn't dragged his feet up Funchilin pass and insisted a runway be built at Hagaru-ri.

While Stanton's discussion of Inchon is pretty typical, he does add that the limited and outdated armaments provided by the Russians was a factor in Chromite's success. Inchon was not much of a test of Almond's mettle, since he was either directly under MacArthur's wing, or Admiral Struble's during the amphibious phase of the assault.

Stanton describes the bottlenecks caused by moving the marines from Seoul, around the peninsula by boat to Wonsan harbor, which was mined by the Russians. Japanese crews helped clear the mines, actions that could have had pretty substantial international repercussions if they had been captured or discovered. Army personnel and materiel returning to Pusan clogged the woefully inadequate South Korean rail and road system, in addition to falling prey to isolated bands of snipers and guerrillas. Once the army and marines had landed they encountered scattered guerilla groups in North Korea. Meanwhile, ROK units fought pitched battles with Chinese soldiers: the first, ominous warnings of Chinese intervention.

There is a good description in this book of why MacArthur wanted to advance to the Yalu, comparing it with the Italian peninsular campaign. The thirst for infantry units to march northward was insatiable, stripping posts of Puerto Ricans on the Panama Canal and "less desireable, especially black" soldiers elsewhere. Almond was firmly convinced integration would weaken military efficiency.

Almonds two Army division commanders--David Barr and Robert Soule-- had personally witnessed the Chinese civil war and should have known the Chinese were accomplished cold weather, mountain fighters and marchers. US forces were stunned to see Chinese soldiers wearing sneakers. Chinese weapons, chain of command, and tactics differed markedly from the NKPA.

The army disaster east of the Chosin reservoir was due to a communications breakdown that 'bordered on command criminal negligence;' with inadequate radios, and failure to share frequencies or intelligence data. It was largely due to the constant rivalry between Marine and Army commands in X corps.

In summary, Almond was compelled to follow MacArthurs order: the real strategic blunders were made in Tokyo. But Almond shares the blame also: his loyalty robbed him of independent judgement (the whole problem with loyalty in any institution, when loyalty is to people, not principle. So fuck you military guys!). His prejudices against nonwhite soldiers in the Polyglot, multiracial X-corps affected his command. The Army justified Almonds failures--in WWII and Korea--by blaming black troops: "if Almond can't get them to fight...nobody can." In his defense Stanton mentions that Almonds' constant visits to the front lines maintained functional effectiveness of the corps during the frigid North Korean winter conditions.

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