As an analyst the command decisions are more interesting.
There were other limits and sanctuaries as well: UN bases in Korea (Pusan, for example) were never bombed; Russian air and naval support was never more than just adequate. These limits illustrate the complex, political nature of cold war warfare. If it was new to us then, it most certainly is not now. But have we learned from it?? Not much...if you ask me!
This book is similar to Donald Knox's texts (reviewed on page one) since it consists of a series of short stories. But Knox's book is more effective because the stories are interwoven and tie the book together as a coherent whole. Tomedi's book and a few others like it are more disjointed, if still useful reading.
Tomedi adds to the Korean War literature significantly with Bill Chambers' saga as a graves registration person. Few authors talk or discuss the role of these final scavengers of the battlefield, assigned the grim task of assembling and identifying human remains. Harry Summers--who has a bevy of books about the war himself-- states that Ridgways' miracle was getting the US army off the roads [tankbound, he said] and up onto the hills and ridges where the enemy were. Ridgway concentrated on killing the enemy--not taking territory. Louis Millet is modest enough to admit that his famous bayonet charge was successful primarily because the Chinese decided to throw grenades rather then use their rifles. Sherman Pratt's views from Heartbreak Ridge, and a stern lecture from a French Legionnaire about the UN intervention, is a rare glimpse of how moral considerations reach the battlefield itself.
Three chapters highlight the air war-- ground support, strategic bombing, and combat fighters. Ben Scotts' experience as a black officer in a white army should be required reading for all Korean war buffs. [Despite the 'patronizing expectation of failure.... there was no better institution in American life, no better one anywhere, than the army for the black man in the forties and fifties.' ] So should Blaine Freidlander's experience with the ROKs, who many GIs held in contempt for bugging out or cowardice. ROKs were effective and disciplined fighters, once they were trained, as Jim Houlton makes clear in the a later chapter describing how they proved themself at White Horse mountain. Friedlander was, however, put off by the cruelty and severity of the ROKs; those were accepted characteristics of Korean society, apparently. [roughstuff comment: they still are. Korea is a very heavyhanded, authoritarian society. ]
It staggers the imagination that Stanley Weintraub, a college professor in charge of POW processing, was forced to use those very same POWs as translators. In fact the whole POW/internment/Koje uprising issue is such an example of post WWII cold-war naivete about the intentions, tactics, and style of communists that I am not surprised that McCarthy hysteria about spies reached the intensity that it did.
Overall, a good book. Some unique stories and insights from folks on the ground in Korea.
Toland, John In Mortal Combat
Korea, 1950-53 DS 918 T658 1991
I want to use the title of this book to contrast Mortal Combat, which is what war is all about, with Mortal Kombat, which is what Clintonesque left wing radicals think it is all about. To be fair, the Pentagon did not help matters much with its 'videos of missiles going thru store windows' in Desert Storm. Some blame goes to Hollywood's celluloid warriors, who have been trying sanitize battle for decades, and the Air Force, which thinks war consists of flyboys doing a few afternoon sorties and returning in time for dinner at the Officers club.
I once met an editor who claimed he could decide if a book was suitable for publication after reading just three pages. I must state a concurring opinion. The early pages-- preface, contents, organization of a book-- are critical indicators of the quality which follows. In this sense, Tollands book does a good job, stating a few questions about the Korean War he will attempt to answer. Some questions he answers:
Despite this mixed start, the book is a good chronology of the War and adds some detail not seen in other texts. His coverage of the battles in the east of Korea--Yechon, Taegu-- and the heroism of Private Myers are unique. Readers of Knox's books will recognize names, battles, and terrain of the Pusan perimeter; Tollands narrative is more detailed and analytical.
With respect to the Inchon landing, Toland also enlightens the reader. The Chinese told Kim Il Sung to expect and amphibious assault at that time and place (perhaps they read the NY Times, also?) but the 'great leader' was quite convinced his In-Min Gun would have the war wrapped up by then. Toland warms the heart of this former collegiate debater when he points out that McArthur skillfully accused critics of his Inchon landing of opposing any amphibious assault. Furthermore, General Walker felt at the time, and speculated even more later in the War and in the book, that the Inchon landing might have been a technical success but a tactical failure: it was too far behind enemy lines. Many enemy remained south of the parallel and harassed UN supply routes.
Another contribution Toland makes: everyone on the ground was wondering why the Chinese 'disappeared' into the hills after their initial assaults in early November. Some felt it was a warning from the Chinese, and having made their point, they vanished. Wrong: it was a tactic by Mao to exploit McArthur's overconfidence. UN forces indulged the Chinese premier by marching northward into the trap.
Other than these the authors' narratives and outlook on the war and negotiations closely resemble other authors. I do have a final question for Toland: is Maggie Higgins your fantasy or something?? For the first third of the book or so, Maggie Higgins makes more cameo appearances than Ted Kennedy at an IRA fundraiser.
Appleman, Roy E. East Of Chosin
Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950
This is a book for Korean War hardcores, focusing exclusively on the command, tactical and other decisions which led directly to the disaster of Task Force Faith east of the Chosin reservoir in early December 1950. As such it is extremely detailed in its discussion of terrain, platoon layout and attacks by forces on boths sides, communication blunders, and so on. (Keep in mind the whole tragedy unfolded over just 4 days.) There are many maps in the book; even so, I was tempted at times to lay out a topographic map of my own and stick pins in it to represent crucial encounters the author refers to. Unless you can follow and appreciate this level of detail (and have a morbid need to understand the tragedy of the 31st RCT at its fullest) this book is probably going to bore you to death or you will just sail along with the text and not really get a FEEL for the battle.
Problems with Army troop training and command are discussed by many authors and occurred in numerous spots during the first part of the war, until Ridgway whipped the forces into shape and back into fighting mood. Appleman mentions them here, since there were a lot of problems with troop discipline as the breakout proceeded. But he does not make it a big issue, for two reasons. One, its easy to look back and second guess decisions made under such extreme conditions. Second he feels its largely unproductive; we should concentrate on learning from mistakes, not thrashing ourselves because of them.
The first error was moving troops up to the forward positions at Pyongnuri-gang inlet [henceforth, for obvious reasons, the 'inlet'] immediately after the Marines left the position. The 31st RCT mission was to protect the Marines flank on the east side of the reservoir, and army units were rushed to Hagaru-ri pell-mell. Forces in the area must have known plenty of enemy were around-- the Marines had just finished a 5 day battle with the Chinese as they climbed Funchilin Pass. A reconnaisance platoon sent up the Inlet simply disappeared. Given this it was foolish to send troops to the Inlet and beyond until they reached regimental strength. Not only were Army battalions smaller than Marine ones, but the Army personnel were, on balance, less experienced fighters and rifleman than the Marines were. In defense of the much-maligned soldiers Appleman points out that KATUSA's were a much larger portion of the Army's field strength; whereas the Marines used very few and chiefly as interpreters.
Still, it would require a lot of smoke and mirrors to hide all the army's deficiencies which brought on its Chosin disaster. Poor discipline, platoon placement and snoozing soldiers made the confrontation with the Chinese on the night of the 27th worse than it should have been. Even when Faith ordered a consolidation of positions at the Inlet the next day, he still must have been under the impression tank support from his 2nd battalion was on the way, as he merely ordered abandoned vehicles to be disabled...not destroyed. [Logistic bottlenecks, poor discipline, and Chinese control of large sections of the MSR in the vicinity of Funchilin pass meant the 2nd would never arrive.] Ammo drops were in the wrong place or drifted over the Chinese. Communications were so poor that Faith didn't even know he did have tank battalion just a few miles away! Once the breakout began, communication within the column itself was poor or missing as platoons became mixed; some men didn't even know a breakout was taking place. Discipline vanished as more officers and NCOs were killed or wounded.
All these problems and others will fit in the readers mind better if you turn to chapter 22 near the books end--"Could Task Force Faith Have Been Saved?"-- where Appleman summarizes many of the problems the 31st RCT suffered. Appleman lays out eight factors which doomed the effort. Of these, the crucial command blunder was the withdrawal of the 31st Tank company (the one Faith couldn't talk to!) from Hudong-ni, just 4 miles to the south, the day before the breakout. "In the end," sighs Appleman, "this doomed Task Force Faith." Other blunders are smaller but still incomprehensible: the failure to have a backup plan in the event the road convoy stalled, for example.
Interestingly, Knox's 1st book includes many first-person accounts of the attack, consolidation, convoy and escapes over the ice. Only two of them appear in Appleman's book: USMC Captain Stanford, who was the forward air controller, and Sergeant Chester Bair, with the convoy as a mechanic. Perhaps--and this is pure speculation on my part-- the many others in Knox's book were among those who slipped away prematurely on hill 1221 and over the ice. If they declined comment because they thought Appleman (or anyone else) would be judgemental they would be mistaken.
Appleman does make clear that, despite common belief, a relief tank/infantry relief force did not leave Hagaru-ri on the morning of December 2 in an attempt to rescue the convoy. In agonizing detail the author makes clear that a preliminary Marine order was never issued in final form, partly because of some discussion over the size of the accompanying infantry force. This mistaken belief is probably because readers confuse this relief force, never sent, with the tank battalion at Hodong-ni, withdrawn on November 30th.
Appleman, Roy Escaping the Trap
US Army X Corps in North Korea 1950 DS 918.2 C35 A69 1990
This is the larger story that contains in part East of Chosin reviewed above. The book talks about the roles of Marine and Army ground units, as well as Naval air support in the entire reservoir area and the MSR to evacuation at Hungnam. Despite the disaster east of the reservoir, the final evacuation to Hungnam occurred in a most professional mannner and in no way resembled a Dunkirk, despite US news media hysteria cooed on by their communist sympathizers.
On the other hand Appleman makes clear that while the Chinese had a manpower advantage (and even that was not as overwhelming as many thought), they had no artillery, tanks, air support or motor transit. Their largest weapons were small mortars.
Appleman is a powerful writer who elegantly weaves battlefield action, command decisions, and military analysis into a cogent text. Among his insights:
Especially useful is the last chapter where Appleman evaluates Chinese and X corps command and field decisions. Appleman feels the Chinese were correct to attack UN forces directly at Chosin. An attack further north would have left Hungnam open for evacuation or reinforcement. An attack further south would not be a surprise since X-corps knew Chinese were in the area.
Appleman feels the Chinese attack at Chosin failed for several reasons. First, their manpower advantage was not as overwhelming as many writers suggest. 'Human Wave' tactics were largely a myth, though the Chinese often massed attacks on one spot. Perhaps most important, the US Marines did not panic: they remained and fought in their perimeters (no better example than Fox company at Toktong pass) as they moved south.
Appleman slips into military jargon--"element of surprise"; "mass of forces"; still, at Hagaru the Chinese lost the former and didn't capitalize on the latter. He also is stretching military journalism a bit in his references to "Xenophon's retreat from Asia Minor." Still, the fact remains that the Marines knew they had to control the higher ground in order to retreat. The Army did not: not east of Chosin, nor in the west at Kunu-ri.
Hoyt, Edwin The Pusan Perimeter
Korean, 1950DS 919 H65 1984
An instant comment to Hoyt and others. Never photocopy a topographic map into black and white.The maps in this book are illegible and almost useless, which is a real drawback, since the Pusan Perimeter was such an important goal line stand by the UNC forces.
Hoyt has a table pounding style that may grate on the reader but will resonate with military professionals and those with combat experience who brook no excuses when it comes to training and ever-readiness as synonomous with military service. Hoyt is caustic about the condition of Army troops and the absurd ground situation in Korea that July of 1950. Generals Walker and Dean--"overstuffed and sporting double chins" from the good life under Japanese occupation-- are not spared. In any case, gradually our forces hardened and weaponry became more effective, slowing the advance after the Kum river.
Hoyt is at his best with his off-the-cuff honest comments:
But for all his bombastic style so far, hang onto your hat for the final chapter. I was reading it in a coffee shop and had to step outside for some badly needed fresh air. Hoyt jumps on the high horse, but he speaks good horse sense. Blame the poor condition of the Army on our naivete in foreign policy. (Americans better learn if our military is civilian controlled, the buck stops with the people). Hoyt then has a rapid fire rendition of the Chinese civil war, Russian chess moves in Northeast Asia, our lack of attention to Asian events, and America's military drawdown.
In a dramatic about-face the author returns to the issue of the 'disgraceful failure of the 24th Infantry Regiment as a fighting unit.' He has no room for racists: military prejudice became a self-fulfilling process. Consider the 555 Parachute Infantry (the 'triple nickel'). Trained by fighting forest fires in Oregon and Washington, 'extinguishing a fire started by a Japanese balloon was the closest the 555th ever got to action against an enemy.' In contrast, in integrated units blacks did fine, as historian S.L.A. Marshall demonstrated.
In the complex thicket of charges and investigations of the 24th, Hoyt keeps a clear head. He has no room for 24th IR apologists, either. There was no doubt it failed in its duty. Hoyt scowls both at Thurgood Marshall for suggesting 'evidence existed that would clear most of them ' ; and at Walter White, who ignored the fact that the Army did honor those blacks in the 24th who fought valiantly.
In the end, it was rotation and replacement of troops which integrated the 24th into an effective fighting unit.
Book reviews will continue to be added here at a slightly reduced pace, now that the school year has begun. Expect about four to eight books per month.
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