The most moving part of the book comes at the end where the author delivers two tributes. One is to his ex-wife, also a former Marine, who remains in Soderbergh's mind as '...that talented sergeant who represented everything that was good about Women Marines.." The other is his personal interest in WM Germaine Catherine Laville. Laville, who died in a tragic fire while at Cherry Point, has a dormitory at LSU named after her. Soderbergh, who was a student at LSU when he noticed her picture, had his interest piqued by this woman Marine, and decided to write a biography of Laville.
Korean War scholars and researchers will appreciate the bibliography and footnotes in this text.
Breuer, William B. Shadow Warriors
The Covert War in Korea DS 921.5 S7 B74 1996
The well published Mr. Breuer--he boasts 23 other war-related texts-- has quite a talent for writing gripping text. Readers will find alot about the Korean War here not described in other books. There is a detailed description of the myriad of deceptive tactics employed by the North Koreans to distract attention from their imminent attack in the Seoul Corridor. Several chapters describe the preparations for the Inchon landing. Operation Trudy Jackson, using surveillance garnered from the small island of Yonghung, twelve miles south of Inchon, gathered vital data on troop strength, tidal ranges, placement of enemy mines, etc. I am eternally grateful to Breuer for finally translating Wolmi-Do as 'moon tip island'. (By the way, sunset and moonset over the Yellow Sea are a joy to behold...roughstuff)
Breuer is a bit confusing when he talks simultaneously about Inchon being a 'secret', while soldiers in Pusan, Japan, and the US referred to it as Operation Common Knowledge. Not only had the Chinese wargamed an Inchon landing as a possibility (and never informed the North Koreans they had done so), but the NY Times itself ran an article suggesting the idea in its September 14, 1950 edition. Breuer acknowledges this, but then shifts his focus to the disinformation campaign designed to fool the North Koreans the landing would be at Kunsan. I think his point should be to make clear that secrets are hard to keep and it is best to sew confusion to obscure your true intentions.
Breuer says the damage done by the Philby/Maclean/Burgess spy ring was primarily leaks of UN battle plans in North Korea, especially the restrictions placed on MacArthur. The Chinese knew they did not have to worry about another amphibious landing, for example. (Even when Van Fleet wanted a series of amphibious assaults up Korea's east coast, it was shot down-- the US had decided on a limited war.) Although the spies did their best to hide evidence of planned Chinese intervention, enough evidence was available from Commanders on the ground, and through other channels (such as the Indian Ambassador).
Other intelligence operations had a mixed outcome. The Li-mi project, an attempt to distract and tie down Chinese Communist armies in Yunan Province, was largely a failure. The US missed a major propoganda coup when they failed to publicize that smallpox raged in the devastated Chinese/North Korean territory. Ironically, it was the US that later suffered a barrage of Communist accusations about 'biological warfare.' The North Koreans constantly deceived US aerial reconnaisance into thinking major damage had been inflicted on roads, bridges, tunnels, and supply convoys.
The authors' references to spy operations in Manchuria are interesting but sketchy and incomplete. Readers looking for cloak-and-dagger intrigue in Manchuria might want to read Lawrence Gardella's Sing a Song to Jenny Next, instead. And the elaborate preparations to kidnap Syngman Rhee--who was dismayed at the US's willingness to accept a permanent division of the Peninsula-- make amusing reading for those aware of the crosscurrents of loyalty vs. pragmatism in the Cold War era.
Some spy operations pay off in ways that are unanticipated. Such was the outcome of operation Moolah, which offered a hundred grand to any communist who landed a MIG-15 at Kimpo airport. Two months after the War was over, North Korean Air Force Captain Ro Kum Suk did exactly that. His story is reviewed below.
No Kum-Sok. A Mig-15 to Freedom
with J. Roger Osterholm DS 921.6 N6 1996
All right all right! In cyberspace I stand corrected ...its No, not Ro Kum-Sok. I never could get those Korean names straight when I lived there either. Actually I am surprised the author's name isn't Kim. Rudyard Kipling would have loved Seoul....
This is a good book, interesting reading. As a non-flyer, non-pilot all the tech talk about MiGs vs. Sabres is a bit daunting, but if you are a fan of the Public Television show Wings, this book is for you.
The book starts with the author landing at Kimpo before some dumbfounded US personnel. Then he flashes back to his childhood under Japanese occupation. Mixed in with discussion of childhood pranks is a rapid fire, zipped version of Korean history from the Shilla dynasty to the present. While no admirer of the Japanese (like many Koreans, he stauchly refers to the Sea of Japan as the 'east sea.') he points out that the Red Army also had a record of rape and pillage. This will not sit well with selective outrage enthusiasts who use the 'comfort women' issue for Japan bashing in the region.
Kum-Sok states that the Korean Navy and Air Force collapsed early in the war...it was the Inmingun, or North Korean Army, that held together. Kum-Soks' summary of the war is essentially the western rendition of the battles. When the stalemate developed after mid 1951, the war shifted to the skies over North Korea and Manchuria. It remains a common myth that the US did not pursue MiGs into the skies of northeast China, but after April 1952, says the author, they did exactly that with deadly effectiveness, knocking MiGs down as they slowed to land. Again, stories about air wars and battles are hard for me to follow and understand, and Kum-Sok often gets lost in endless renditions of sorties, statistics, or engineering specifications. Still, he does discuss a number of weaknesses that MiGs had.
After he defected to the south came the inevitable interrogation, tests of his credibility, and finally, fame. OF COURSE, one issue of tremendous relevance that our security services made sure to ask about was whether No Kum-Sok 'ever had sex with another man.' [I can just hear these losers on the runway at Kimpo now...what? You're a faggot! take that MiG back to North Korea NOW, homeboy!!!]
By the way Kum-Sok was unaware of the operation Moolah offer for a MiG, and defected to the west almost two months after the KoreanWar was over. He did receive the 100 grand, however.
Thompson, James True Colors
1004 Days as a POW DS 921.6 T47 1989
Originally published in 1981 as Camp 5 this is a crusty, in your face account of the authors experience in a North Korean/Chinese POW camp. After some pithy testimonials, Thompson states he wrote this book, in part, to refute the perception that many blacks collaborated with the enemy in his camp or others.
The chronological approach to camp events is somewhat monotonous, but interesting characters and survival principles weave the text together. So does Thompsons' 1950s street-talk style. I can imagine the tea-and-crumpet embassy set politely wincing when they read about Thompson and his buddies spending their spare time 'cracking lice' or pulling a twenty eight foot tapeworm out of a Turkish POW's butt. But I say, right on brother Thompson! Lay it on thick and real until those Foggy Bottom pansyasses puke in their caviar. Needless to say, I like Thompson's style of writing. Readers can revel in the following:
On a more serious and moving note, Thompson vividly describes methods of physical and mental torture used by the Koreans and Chinese. Whether it was making Thompson stand barefoot on a frozen lake, or beating Sgt Riley in front of all the prisoners assembled, such techniques failed.
Psychological ploys were a bit more successful. White NCOs wanted to keep a sharp eye on black NCOs anyway, and these seeds of distrust were exploited by the Koreans. Further mistrust was sewn when guards made it appear as if blacks were fed sumptious meals in exchange for cooperation with authorities. 'Neither a flaming radical nor weeping liberal', Thompson still claims that blacks were just as poorly treated as whites were. "Whites distrusted blacks and chose to interpret actions as collaboration." For example, with operation Little Switch, to release sick POWs, many people lied about illnesses to get released early. (Who could really blame them?) But Thompson says that only blacks were pressured and criticized later. According to Thompson's research 'not one of the blacks released in Little Switch completed their 20 years of service."
One memory that haunts Thompson to this day was a claim by his study period instuctor, nicknamed Chop Suey. Talking to Thompson about the Boxer Rebellion, Chop says "drugs and dope defeated us! Not the British!" Then, after an ominous silence, Chop Suey added.."the same thing will happen in America."
Paschall, Robert Witness to War
DS 921.6 P33 1995
I like Paschall's book, but I wish I could like it more. The author, a retired Army Colonel, 'was schooled by Vets of the Korean War.' He tweaked my interest immediately when he said the book was the 'story of the war in the words who fought it.'
Well, the author frequently quotes other texts or reports verbatim, but that is not first person. Quoting an army cameraman who got a 'lulu of a shot' provides a pretty pale rendition of the Inchon landing. During Knox's account of the Chosin disaster (Knox's books are reviewed on page one of my book reviews.) I shivered with cold. (by the way, I was cold. My quarters were brutally air conditioned) Paschall's 'firsthand' accounts are sterile and dull.
The author does a good job showing how Matt Ridgway turned around an army dispirited and reluctant to engage the enemy. Ridgway states the case for a limited war in Korea in very cogent terms: the US had other responsibilities and military limitations of its own.
The story of the rescues of the 7th infantry, and the 23rd RCT [Task Force Crombez, for you Korea buffs] are gripping accounts of action under fire. But his pallid interview with a few NK POW's describing how they evaded US airstrikes is weak and incomplete. The North Koreans did a hell of a lot more than just walk, wear white, and scatter to the hills when they heard US aircraft!
It is amusing to hear General Spike Momyer say Americans could not 'follow [MiGs] into Chinese air space' in hot pursuit, when it was done constantly after April 1952. If you want to read about cat-and-mouse games between MiGs and F-86 Sabres, read No Kum Sok's book reviewed above. On the other hand, Paschall's description of how the North Koreans used their rugged terrain to neutralize American advantage in armor and airpower is good [although the officer who is being quoted is never revealed in the text] .
Secretary of State Atcheson's summary of negotiation issues is scattered and incomplete (then again, so was Atcheson). You'd be much better off reading Turner Joy's firsthand account.
Paschall needs to realize that very often a historical issue has to be well explained and developed, or it is best not treated at all. Much the same criticism can be made for the repatriation issue: you may as well turn to Joy's book. Paschall is much better when he discusses issues other authors have not covered much, such as how General Clark's improved ROK army demonstrated its mettle at the Battle for White Horse. So is his description of the final hours on the lines before the truce became effective at 10 PM local time.
The final chapter is the best part of the book. His discussion of post Korean War military doctrine: limited war, massive retaliation, flexible response; is superb. It is ironic that Paschall, for all his claims that this book is a 'firsthand account of the war from those who lived it,' is at his best when writing in his own words. Even here, though, there is room for improvement. His claim that 'beyond doubt a prime reason for the poverty of NK is its bloated military establishment' could be right out of Jane Fonda's playbook. Like most analysts, the author equates natural resources with wealth. If that was the case, Africa and Siberia would be the worlds economic superpowers. It is economic and political freedom (Hong Kong, The US and Canada, Europe and Australia) which leads to economic growth and prosperity. But I don't mind military guys taking a stab at economics. After all...I take stabs at military analysis all the time.
Evanhoe, Ed. Dark Moon
8th Army SpecOps in the Korean War DS 921.5 D4 E83 1995
Ok folks. By now you know I am not your typical book promoter masquerading as a reviewer. You also know i have a bias toward guys (and gals) on the front line and little patience with highbrow Academy and Embassy armchair militarists. Not that Evanhoe is one of these...by no means. But why insult the readers intelligence (and this from an intelligence guy, no less!) by claiming 'intelligence operations...require personnel whose conduct..is above reproach? " Say what? Just two paragraphs later Evanoe claims most senior commanders are uncomfortable with the "agents, whores, black marketeers, and traitors.." used in collecting intelligence.
This is one of these books that tries to intimidate the reader into believing that intelligence operations can only be understood (and carried out) by a small cadre of specially trained spookmeisters. (The rest of us must just read books and gape in admiration, I presume.) BULLSHIT! You wanna read what makes a good spook? Read Rudyard Kipling's Kim about the boy of the same name: a witty, worldy, wise and wonderful hustler in his teen years. More information is obtained in the course of ordinary commerce than these military guys ever dreamed of--a fact the US Intelligence community is finally waking up to. I also hate intelligence guys who hide behind acronyms and Evanhoe, with OSS,OSU,UDT,USNSOG,K, CK,FECLEG,FECOM, CCRAK,ATIS,HID,TILO,KMAG and a few others by page 15 of the text is starting to get my goat. The reader will be bored stiff hearing about Washington turf wars; but it is important to understand the vacuous, credentialist swamp that spooks are forced to inhabit and in which administrators thrive.
Well, what about the book? Not bad in alot of places. Typical for such books, the author starts out with a summary of Korean history and the peninsula's unfortunate strategic importance as a bridge to the Asian mainland. America's intelligence focus on Europe, and McArthurs distrust of the CIA, meant we had to build a network in the area. Hans Tofte performed this job well.
When Evanhoe finally gets around to specific operations, the book also takes a turn for the better. Task force Leopard, with its use of ligistical wonders such as hot-headed diesels, false bottom 'honey pots', and such, made amusing reading. Operation Virginia, with its goal of blowing up rail lines, tunnels and bridges, starts out sounding like Lawrence of Arabia. Plagued by poor planning and unrealistic logistics, it ends up sounding like the Donner party. Operation Spitfire learned enough from Virginia to make a whole new set of mistakes of its own. Mustang II was a wild goose chase to try and free General Dean.
More successful and colorful were the use of Donkey/Partisan groups on the Korean Islands and Mainland to raise hell behind enemy lines. Navy Lt. Clark found that young kids and old geezers made the best intelligence gatherers (shades of Kim) since they could masquerade as refugees. Still, William Breuer's book (reviewed above) does a better job talking about donkey/partisans than Evanhoe does.
For an more technical review of Evanhoe's book, try Kimsoft's website.
In any case, one of the authors prejudices is common to intellectuals and academicians of the post WWII era. It can be summed up as follows.
American foreign policy sucks. In the name of anticommunism we support corrupt, venal, wealth sucking local despots instead of the communists. The latter are just misguided land reformers and idealists. In contrast, look at our support of the Diems; the Shah; Chiang kai Shek; Allende....ad nauseum
But...but...but, like I said, don't jump to conclusions about this book. Hoyt would laugh, too. But please, he would add, don't let McCarthyism lead to the purges of qualified personnel from the State department. Guys like John Service or John Davies are invaluable when you want an answer to the question "will the Chinese intervene if we cross the 38th parallel?" Even so, the US was warned repeatedly by the Indian ambassador about Chinese concerns; we ignored them. Perhaps we would have ignored these two guys, also.
I might add a separate issue that the author never addresses, and which infuriates me about this text and others similar to it. North Korea invaded the South--plain, simple enough. Just what sort of insane logic suggests that the totality of our military response should be MERELY to push the aggressors back to the original border? (If a rapist breaks into your wife's apartment, is it sufficient to merely push him back out the door?) I argue elsewhere on this site that the UN forces rush to the Yalu was a fololish move for military purposes: the winter, the mountains, the logistics were all against UN forces. But it certainly was well within the prerogative of UN/ROK forces to respond in such a way as to destroy North Korea's ability to invade the South again, for some indefinite period. If the Chinese objected to that, well, thats too damn bad.
Face it. The Korean war occurred because Acheson's 'sphere of influence' speech suggested to the Communists (wherever they were) that invading the south would have no consequences. It almost didn't! After that, American and Chinese generals traded periods of arrogance and comeuppance. In the meantime, a whole bunch of people died.
Withdrawal of US forces from Northeast Asia is still a Chinese foreign policy goal. Ironically, the unification of the Korean Peninsula may hand the Chinese just the trump card they need to get that process started, as I discuss in my article Korean Unification and Northeast Asian Stability.
McDonald, Callum Britain and the Korean war
DS 919.3 M33 1990
Wow!!! I thought i would never see the day. After slogging through Hoyt's dense text reviewed above, I despaired of ever reading a book which states the post WWII geo-political situation concisely and in the words people alive then would have used. Feast your eyes on the following paragraph from McDonalds text.
Britain went to war in 1950 to consolidate the Anglo-American allaince and to resist communist aggression, goals which were inextricably linked in the minds of the men who made policy. Their decision owed nothing to the direct importance of Korea itself to British interests. For the next three years Britain was to fight in but not for Korea, often displaying scant regard for Korean wishes and interests as it pursued these larger goals.
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