Roughstuff's Korean War Archive
book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis
Turner Joy How Communists Negotiate
DS 921.6 J6
Whew!!! Wanna quick review of 2 years of communist stalling and intransigence? Read this old book that dates back to the fifties. One could never get a book like this published in this genteel revisionist era, where the UN asks us to share the angst of the North Korean people as they starve to death under Stalinomics. This book is depressing in such an enlightening way. Its all here...the lies, deceits, red herrings, and imbecilic behavior we've come to know and love from Communists the world over.
On a lighter note. Admiral Joy would make an excellent neo-Jesus. He is very good at making analogies and parables which exemplify the inherent contradictions which often typified the Communist positions. He makes it clear that communists often have succeeded in obtaining at the bargaining table what they did not, or could not, obtain on the battlefield.
His book covers the negotiations not so much in a chronological fashion-- although there is much of that-- as by devoting individual chapters to various communist negotiating tactics. Readers familiar with the Korean and Vietnam War talks will recognize the following.
- Piss ass tactics: getting upset about who faced north or south; cutting the legs of Turner Joy's chair down so he barely reached the table.
- loading the agenda: the communists wanted specific concessions on agenda items; the UN wanted the agenda merely to say what would be discussed. The UN prevailed on this issue, but as Joy makes clear, the order of agenda items-- which provided for a cessation of hostilities before any further items could be discussed-- enabled the communists to use the lull in fighting to rebuild their forces.
- using outside incidents and distractions to embarass your opponent and force concessions. who can forget all the foolish claims of chemical/germ warfare, or the Koje-Do uprising?
- exploit western impatience: this is especially directed at the western news media commentators anxious for 'progress.' This 'shaking down' tactic is still being used by the North Koreans today, in the negotiations over 'food aid.'
Joy also talkes about a few blunders made by the UN side. The ones most readers are familiar with are the decisions by the UN side
- to allow reconstruction of airfields in North Korea ...
- to not use aerial reconnaissance as a means of monitoring compliance with armistice terms... and lastly
- to oppose the Communist selection of Russia as a neutral country, not for the clear and meaningful reason that it was an aggressor in the conflict, but for the far weaker reason that it shared a "common border with North Korea.'
Allowing construction of airfields meant that Soviet MIGs could refuel at North Korean bases, attack UN forces, and then scoot back into their santuaries in Manchuria. Without aerial reconnaisance ensuring true compliance with Armistice terms would be impossible. And UN officials were so petrified of offending the Russians that they hesitated to even label them as
aggressors in the conflict. Such timidity makes George Bush look decisive.
Joy claims these concessions and wafflings undercut the team negotiating in Panmunjom. Of course, it is a fact of life for negotiators from Western Democracies that the merits and weaknesses of their positions are discussed not only at the tbale, but in the press and political forums back home.
The most interesting part of the book is where Joy gives six powerful arguments that the prisoner repatriation issue should not have been part of the negotiations. Not only was it an arbitrary extension of Articles 7 and 118 of the Geneva Convention, but it was a political issue, not a military one, and had no business in an armistice agreement. He continues....
Voluntary repatriation placed the welfare of communist soldiers above that of our own UN command personnel in Communist prison camps, and above that of UN personnel still on the battle lines in Korea.
page 152
Quite a different view than many others have taken of prisoner repatriation! Of course, Admiral Joy was speaking as a military person, rather than as a State Department Goody-two-shoe, so such frankness is to be expected.
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