book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis
The insights begin right with the introduction, when it becomes clear that Jian has a more mature approach to the War and China’s role in it. He assumes that China’s motives were determined by the Chinese themselves: they were not, as many western analysts assume even to this very day, a ‘response to American actions’ and initiatives. There was much more at stake than just ‘preserving the Sino-Korean border!’ China had just re-emerged as a world power; it had aligned itself with Moscow; and it was anxious to appear in the vanguard of the socialist revolution. Given these roles Jian argues there was “little possibility that China’s entrance into the Korean War could have been averted.” Chinese nationalism was rooted in part on their feeling of ‘cultural superiority:’ something we Americans should understand, as we feel the same way. China was, in those 1940s and early 1950s, re-emerging as a world power as it finally won its civil war with Chiang Kai Shek and re-established its territorial (Tibet) integrity and of course, sought to finish the job with Taiwan. Their task was to oppose (American) imperialism everywhere in the world, going so far as to neither trade nor accept aid from such nations. China was in no rush to be ‘recognized’ by foreign nations, nor did they acknowledge diplomatic initiatives and titles given by the old Guomindang regime. Thus the Ward controversy spiraled into greater significance; the differences between the USA and China on issues were so great, the more contact they had with one another, the worse the situation got.
China had to ‘prove to the Soviets that, while they were an independent Communist state’ they were not ‘Titoists;’ though the Chinese ‘leaned to one side’ (Russia) in their dealing with the superpowers, Russia was willing to let China carry the ball with respect to Asian revolutionary struggles. In a sense you might argue that Russia took responsibility for the European theatre and left Asia to the Chinese. The cooperation between Stalin and Mao with regard to Kim Il Sung’s plans to attack the South, was discussed at length in Khruschev’s memoirs. The author believes that Shi Zhe’s account was more detailed: Mao held great reservations about Kim’s plan, even though he felt Kim would proceed with the attack in any case.
China’s approach in asia was based upon its conviction that the Maoist revolution (1) represented a break from imperialism; (2) that it would inevitably spread beyond China; (3) it was China’s responsibility to assist these other peoples with their uprisings, and (4) countries such as Vietnam, Korea, and Taiwan were the areas where these conflicts would be waged. China’s support of Ho Chi Minh against the French was a test case of this doctrine. And since Koreans had fought with the Communists against Chiang in the civil war, ties between the countries were so great that a ‘historian would have trouble explaining why the Chinese did NOT intervene’ in Korea.
From the Chinese perspective—especially that of the Chinese soldier, marching in the bitter cold—it is a pity the Stalin now showed his true colors and reneged on his promise to provide the Chinese troops with ammunition, air and logistical support. China decided to go in anyway—proof again of the authors central theme, which is that China acted in its own interests, not those of allies or opponents—but still, the seeds for the Sino-Soviet split were sown in those early 1950s.
China took three bitter lessons from the Korean War. First, Russia and Stalin were no more to be trusted than those dastardly western imperialists. Second, conflicts with the west could be used to strengthen the legitimacy of their regime domestically by rallying troops and citizens to the anti-western cause. Third, Mao realized that it took more than massive human waves to win a war. American technology had cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of Chinese. They would need advanced armaments, and an atomic bomb of their own.