book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis

Hoyt has a table pounding style that may grate on the reader but will resonate with military professionals and those with combat experience who brook no excuses when it comes to training and ever-readiness as synonomous with military service. Hoyt is caustic about the condition of Army troops and the absurd ground situation in Korea that July of 1950. Generals Walker and Dean--"overstuffed and sporting double chins" from the good life under Japanese occupation-- are not spared. In any case, gradually our forces hardened and weaponry became more effective, slowing the advance after the Kum river.
Hoyt is at his best with his off-the-cuff honest comments:
But for all his bombastic style so far, hang onto your hat for the final chapter. I was reading it in a coffee shop and had to step outside for some badly needed fresh air. Hoyt jumps on the high horse, but he speaks good horse sense. Blame the poor condition of the Army on our naivete in foreign policy. (Americans better learn if our military is civilian controlled, the buck stops with the people). Hoyt then has a rapid fire rendition of the Chinese civil war, Russian chess moves in Northeast Asia, our lack of attention to Asian events, and America's military drawdown.
In a dramatic about-face the author returns to the issue of the 'disgraceful failure of the 24th Infantry Regiment as a fighting unit.' He has no room for racists: military prejudice became a self-fulfilling process. Consider the 555 Parachute Infantry (the 'triple nickel'). Trained by fighting forest fires in Oregon and Washington, 'extinguishing a fire started by a Japanese balloon was the closest the 555th ever got to action against an enemy.' In contrast, in integrated units blacks did fine, as historian S.L.A. Marshall demonstrated.
In the complex thicket of charges and investigations of the 24th, Hoyt keeps a clear head. He has no room for 24th IR apologists, either. There was no doubt it failed in its duty. Hoyt scowls both at Thurgood Marshall for suggesting 'evidence existed that would clear most of them ' ; and at Walter White, who ignored the fact that the Army did honor those blacks in the 24th who fought valiantly.
In the end, it was rotation and replacement of troops which integrated the 24th into an effective fighting unit.