The Korean War: the West confronts Communism. Hickey, Michael.

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Hickey, Michael The Korean War: The West confronts Communism
This is a wonderful book of recent vintage and is an excellent first read for any Korean War neophyte and a refreshing, breezy account of many of the War’s most intractable issues and battles for those already familiar with the action. Hickey is an excellent writer, in the British deference style and polish that also draws this reviewer’s admiration. As a general comment, British (or as he might be tempted to say,‘commonwealth’) accounts of the war always are much much more sophisticated in their analysis of international affairs, because of the UK’s stature as a power on the world stage for a much longer time. The whole society, but in particular its news media, are much more cerebral about foreign affairs than here in America. One need only contrast the questions posed of US presidents by British correspondents versus their US (and particular CNN)colleagues to see this continues to be true today.

Still some of Hickey’s modesty is misplaced. His statement near the end of the book that the Korean war sealed beyond doubt that Britain was now a junior partner in the US/American relationship is untrue. Admittedly the American industrial war machine can far outstrip the UK’s ability to produce and move materiel. But since when has war been fought exclusively on the battlefield? Come come, Mr. Hickey, intelligence, sound judgement, diplomatic initiative and intrigue, and covert action all play a crucial role..and this book makes it clear that the Brits excel at all that.

To see this one need only look at the early chapters which add insights I have not gleaned from other texts. During the Japanese occupation Christian pacifists in Korea identified with the landed elites; communist agitators more with the farming population. Also informative in their brevity is the series of conferences in Cairo, Teheran, and Yalta between the WWII allies during which the importance of Korea rose steadily in Russian eyes and came on the radar screen for US analysts. More exhaustive summaries exist in other texts; but more informative ones do not. There is always a tradeoff between detail on one hand and summary/brevity on the other, and Hickey balances them well.



Of course the US was outplayed in Korea in the post WWII era. Here Hickeys’ coverage can be spotty. He has no comment on how the 38th parallel was selected (Acheson picked off a map as a child might lay out hop-scotch in a schoolyard). Nor does Hickey point out that the Russians probably forewent claiming all of Korea (as was well in their ability) in exchange for what they hoped would be occupation of part of Japan. On the other hand, while making clear that General Hodge was an incompetent boor who hated the Koreans he was to oversee in trusteeship, the text praises him for the job he did feeding and clothing the miserable returning masses in the country. The triumvirate that surrounded MacArthur in Tokyo is singled out for uniquely British journalistic sneer. Almond is portrayed as a general hungry for glory after a bad WWII managing the colored ‘flunkeys.’ While Courtney Whitney draws no particular ire as MacArthur’s lawyer and biographer, Charles Willoughby is painted as a ‘grotesque, toadying bully who wreaked horrible damage to UN armies at the end of 1950.’ As for south Korean force training, it was the best that could be mustered under the circumstances: language, dual allegiances in the ranks and conflicting authority chains, wreaked havoc with the ROKs. Not until 1952 would improvements in training make the ROKs a reliable fighting force.

The war started as a result of tragic misreading of US intentions by the Russians. Kim Il Sung promised a quick assault to Pusan within 3 months; Russia promised broad air support but never delivered it. (Most analysts now say Stalin hoped to give the West a black eye by losing South Korea in a lightning war; then decided it would be better to bog America down in an endless quagmire. To boot, he estranged Chinese/American relations for decades to come).



Britain’s need to keep Korea a localized war is made compelling by Hickey’s list of commitments the British government faced in that era. They had troops in Germany, Austria, Trieste; in the former African empires of Italy, Germany and Holland; they were tangled in the middle east over Palestine, had to face the question of how to handle the return of British territories regained from Japan, communist insurgents in Malaya, and finally to protect Hong Kong. American isolationists would flip out at such a platter of responsibilities, but this faced a nation still on wartime rationing (British soldiers ate better in Korea on US rations than civilians back in England) and one who had already hewn off a vast stretch of former empire in Pakistan and India. His comment on the US Army soldiers sent in those early months? “Sergeant Bilko goes to war.” The UN coalition armies had different leadership styles, different ranks and responsibilities, even different artillery calls (Americans use ‘mils’ while Brits used ‘degrees’). Some of the reinforcements scoured from around the world as the war raged on draw chuckles: the Thais had to sent to rear areas, unable to fight in the bitter cold of a Korean winter.

His account of the panic after Chinese intervention also is awfully rapid and spotty. I doubt the communists found the NYTimes articles on the separation of 8th Army and X corps by the Taebek mountains as anything informative. And while I agree the British, first and foremost, felt China needed concessions as the US was routed from the Yalu, to suggest that ‘nothing less than admission of communist China to the UN would suffice’ is ridiculous.

Keep in mind this book is largely about British forces and their roles in the war. The UN's great bugout from Pyongyang was observed with jaws agape. Not only was the enemy nowhere in sight. The Brits were able to scavenge from abandoned storehouses vast quantities of tentage, clothing, and equipment. The Brits bartered beer and liquour (heaven forbid that American forces should have access to alcohol!) for, among other things an L-19 Bird Dog aircraft.

During that winter of discontent, when UN forces were routed and the world feared the clarion wall of global war, all of the UN coalition had conflicts between international commitments and domestic concerns. But Hickey jumps to his second inappropriate conclusion. “It was clear that the British should accept American dominance in Europe as well as Asia and shut up.” I think this goes to far. America has made this claim to its European allies. Europe did little then, and even less now in its Balkan backyard 50 years later. But the British have always done the most and stood with America the firmest. Compare this say, with the French who have always had their own agenda and pitter patter with Russia, China, the Arabs, whoever can humor them into thinking they are still a world power despite failure on the battlefield since Napoleon. The Chinese would agree he went to far, also: they praised the soldiering of many European armies; only the US Marines and the 187th RCT drew similar praise.

Remember the Blue Boys and informants running through North Korean lines and back with valuable information? Hickey said they often were working (secretly) for more than one UN army at the same time and collected fees from them all! They also told how much the NKPA was suffering in the field and, ominously, how political informants would ‘allow’ themselves to be captured and indoctrinate prisoners in Koje later in the war. There was good coverage of the covert operations on the islands off the Korean coast.

The lack of maps in the book becomes a cumulative burden. Nowhere does this become more clear than in the tragic story of the Glosters in the Chinese 5th phase offensive. Much the same can be said for the battles for the heights or Maryang-San and ‘Little Gibraltar.’

In contrast, the descriptions of the use of artillery, patrolling, MASH units and helicopters in the static war is excellent. Hickey praises the helicopter as the greatest single advancement in mobility since the advent of infantry on horseback 2 centuries ago. In contrast, Korea was the graveyard—literally, in some cases—for the Airborne parachute drop. The final chapters highlight the importance of Naval support and, a flyboy favorite, the first airborne battles between jet aircraft, MiGs vs Sabres.

Finally, the treatment of POWs and the Koje prison riots in a separate chapter was helpful, but since it is long out of sequence at the end of the book, you lose the sense of the role they played in the war, propaganda, the negoatiations and Panmunjom, etc. Hickey is more kind to Colson and Dodd—the US camp commander—than US analysts are. ‘Colson’s innate humanity would not permit him to condemn the naïve Dodd to be an imminent execution.’ Hmm…where was Colson’s ‘innate humanity’ when NK political cadres executed prisoners in his camp by the hundreds? Just what is a ‘naïve Dodd’ doing as a POW commandant anyway, especially when UN forces had abundant evidence that infiltrators were in the camps? Still, the Shropshires sure handled the prison camp differently!

Overall, a most successful description of political, military, and personnel events during coalition warfare.



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