Roughstuff's Korean War Archive
book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis
The Korean War: Vols 1 & 2 by Korean Institute of Military History
Oh my my. There is an old saying among radicals of left and right alike. Never demand anything. You just might get it! Well, I have talked a lot on this review site about how I would like to read an exhaustive account of the Korean War written by Koreans. This is it…a massive, even tiresome, but informative account of the performance of ROK units from the earliest hours of the attacks on June 25th 1950, to the end of the Chinese 5th phase offensive a year later. (Subsequent events will be covered in a 3rd volume, pending.
This test is designed to be an updated version of the Hanguk Chonchaengsa and is a major contribution to the Korean War literature. The Hanguk Chongchaengsa was written with a very strong bias against the Korean War, and especially anti-Park, the successor to Syngman Rhee. One pleasant thing the book does is it vastly improves the fighting records of Korean units. Most US accounts are negative, emphasizing the poor performance by ROKs near Hyongsang and Northwestern Korea. This book acknowledges these shortcomings but heaps praise upon ROK performance (admittedly with US air and artillery support in many cases) near Pohang, the rush to Pyongyang, the assault up the east coast to Wonsan, as well as in many anti-guerilla mop-up operations near Chiri-san and Sorak-san. If Chipyong-ni was the Korean Gettysburg for US forces, ROKs can point to their perfomance at Paekmasan—White Horse Mountain. Still be forewarned: this is a blow by blow, squad by squad, hill by hill account of the ROKs. Most readers will find the end of chapter summaries to be far more useful.
The locus of anti-Japanese resistance moved from Manchuria to Shanghai in the waning days of WWII as the Russians would not tolerate organized militias in areas they controlled. The authors say that North Korea’s ‘Sovietization’ was organized well; in the South, efforts were much more confused but they still feel Hodge’s intentions were good. The North originally thought that Guerilla uprisings in the Chiri Mts and Taegu would spread and topple the shaky south, but they were brutally crushed, so the North began to focus on war as primary instrument of its aims. I might add the north continued to think uprisings by southern peasantry would make its dash to Pusan easier also; but this was a fatal miscalculation. Skirmishes along the DMZ were designed to allow partisans to filter thru, as well as harden NKPA forces. There is a good discussion in the text of the shortfall of provisions for the ROK forces; KMAG estimated that the ROKs could only hold out for 15 days.
In the prewar chit chat between Kim Il Sung and the Communist powers, Stalin felt that Kim should provoke the South Koreans and attack 2nd. This was the propoganda line the NKPA took. The Chinese agreed they would intervene if Japan entered the war—a bizarre statement I have my doubts about. Kim Il Sun g argued that the 38th parallel was a meaningless dividing line. Will someone please Fax this view to the revisionists who argue the US crossing the parallel was some kind of aggressive act? The final plans for attack on South Korea were vetted by both Russia and China; China seemed to downplay its planned attack on Formosa later that summer. In any case, the first stage…sudden attack and catching the ROKs off guard, went as planned. The 2nd and 3rd stages did not: both the ROKs and US forces offered resistance, and Kim Il Sung seethed as his cherished guerilla uprisings failed to materialize. The authors make a solid case that NKPA was the instigator, quoting documents and its deployment of forces as proof. In discussing the deployment and armaments of ROK forces, the authors make the crucial point that antitank mines might have turned the NKPA forces in those early hours. The ROK 1st division held its own at the Imjin; but the collapse of the 7th near Tongduchon exposed its flank; ineffective and disorganized backups completed the tragedy and Seoul fell. In the central sector, the loss of a minor but crucial bridge at Soyang enabled armor to cross. The 8th division put up a good fight with community support but still had to retreat to Wonju: already that crossroads town loomed large among military planners.
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