book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis
In contrast, Hak Joon-Kim suggests China was much less involved in the war than westerners think. Alot of information about 'Korean units in Chinese forces' came from Kuomintang sources playing to the US to get military support. These sources suggested it was part of Soviet expansionism since they wanted an asian equivalent to the Marshall/Kennan plan. North Korea's diplomatic, cultural, and scientific ties with China were weak; but strong with Russia. The NKPA was encouraged by China's defeat of the Kuomintang and received moral support, but not military. China returned NK soldiers to Manchuria and North Korea simply for economic reasons.
Gye Dong-Kim argues that, whatever ties Korea might have had with Russia, the Soviets saw the Korean War almost as the US saw it...a distraction from its European emphasis. Thus Kim argues the Russians would hardly approve; they even reduced the number of advisors in the country as war appoached. Much the same can be said for China: world sentiment was already beginning to shift toward allowing them into the UN. The Chinese had played a role in its preparation, but there is no evidence that they ordered or encouraged Kim Il-Sung to attack south. (Roughstuff comment: for further discussion of this 'who did what for whom' topic, see my Frequently Asked Questions section.)
Ra Jong-yil turned the conference's attention to the role played by the British. Britain had other porblems in Europe and with its economy, , so they let the US have a free hand in N.E. Asia. The Brits had a low opinion of US Statesmenship at the time ( the brits ALWAYS have a low opinion of another country's statesmenship...!): confusing nationalism with communism. The British felt the Korean were a very cruel people. (Again: for this recurring issue of the 'cruelty' of the Koreans, see my FAQs) In any case, the Brits intensely disliked Synghman Rhee and really preferred to have a new government once the peninsula was liberated. Of course, subsequent military events rendered thse concerns moot.
Peter Farrar asks a very specific question: Why wasn't a British proposal for a buffer zone on the Yalu never seriously considered? First, it was six weeks too late: forces were already north of the proposed zone, anyway. Also, why make territorial concessions before probing revealed Chinese intentions?? China never responded to furious backroom entreaties. Furhermore, China already had evidence that we would 'limit' the war: Yalu bridges, hot pursuit restrictions, etc. Farrar does not touch on the issue of spies (Philby, etc) in the Foreign Office. Again the Brits hoped the egomaniacal Rhee would be removed once elections were held. Reports of ROK atrocities in the attack north didn't make the British any more comfortable with him.
There are the usual conflicts about American vs British views of monolithic communism. The Brits not only disliked MacArthur for his vanity, but also for his criticism of America's Europe-first policy. In any case the British pushed as hard as they could to restrain rash US military moves and moods; but were themselves limited by the need to remain in alliance with the US. ( Donald McAllum's book on page 2 covers these issues in greater detail.)
More informative is M.L. Dockrill's discussion of the British perspective on the truce negotiations. Dockrill adds new material beyond Turner Joy's book as he focuses on several new points. A post-Korean war conference to settle larger Asian conflicts would be impossible due to thorny questions about China/Taiwan and the stubborness of US Republicans. The British and French chafed about lack of representation at the talks even though there forces were on the battlefield. Further, says Dockrill, the British had to realize that the US and Britain had fundamentally different spheres of interest. Britain was concerned with the Atlantic, Medittereanean, and Western Europe. The US was focused on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Artic oceans. Dockrill also makes clear there was plenty of conflicts between the Foreign Office and Churchill over prisoner repatriation. The major conflicts with the US came down to POWs (especially the proposal by India for a 3rd party of resolve repatriation) and whether China or Taiwan should be seated at the UN.
Reinhard Drifte focuses on the role played by the Japanese. Japanese nationals were used to a limited extent by UN forces. The bureaucratic elite was fervently anticommunist; it hid behind its veil of 'occupation' while it allowed the US to use bases to support the war. Japan relished the employment working at the bases provided. Operation Rollup, a post WWII salvageing of materiel scattered around the Pacific for maintenance and repair in Japan, provided crucial parts in the war's early stages. The US also used maps, place names, and information about Korea that had been assembled by the Japanese. This irked the Koreans no end.
Callum McDonald gives a solid description of communist/anticommunist cells in the POW camps and how this ferocious ideology led to the koje riots. 'The POW repatriation issue had global impact on the battle for the minds of men.' While it is tempting to suggest strict adherence to the original Geneva convention, forcible repatriation might have led to more violence, more riots, etc...
David Rees weaves the complex post WWII status of Japan into a pattern easily understood.The Russians, johnny-come-latelys to the Pacific war, played no role on the Far Eastern Commission that supervised Japanese occupation. After the war broke out Japan, already on its way to being considered an 'ally instead of a conquered enemy', quickly became part of a western pacific security alliance including Australia and New Zealand, its sovereignity restored.