book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis
First: This book makes it clear that the commitment of US forces that summer of 1950 WAS merely a delaying action. In fact, Catchpoole almost makes it sounds like the routs of Task Force Smith, the KUM River, Taejon..were a success! Excuuuse me, the author says: holding Chochiwon 3 days, Taejon 2 days, imposing massive 12th NKPA casualties at Andong and on 2 NKPA battalions at Taegu..so upset the Kim Il Sung’ s scheduled timetable for arrival in Pusan that he fired senior General Kim Hwang Hop. As is made clear in some other texts, the NKPA sealed their fate two other ways. 1st, by crawling slowly down the mountainous east coast (they searched each valley, fearing an ambush), and securing the harbors on the muddy west coast (what a foolish move—not only are they worthless for shipping, the US Navy clearly was superior in both the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan) precious time was wasted as UN forces built up Naktong defenses. 2nd, NKPA General Chaik blundered by attacking all of the perimeter at once; a focused attack would have overwhelmed UN forces and pushed through.
There is a good, brief summary of the In’chon preparations and landing. His maps make clear the bottlenecks and gauntlet endured by the US forces as they headed back to Pusan overland to embark for Wonsan.
Nice insights on the British initiative for a cease-fire after the Chinese lurch and disappearance from the battlefields in early November. Through a leak by the Polish delegate to the UN it became known that China would only agree to a buffer zone if it were linked to the issue of Taiwan’s membership in the security council. America offered talks; the Chinese arrived at the UN with a barrage of anti-american blather. The US vetoed the resolution; later, when the UN condemned China as the aggressor, they walked out of the UN, not to return for 21 years. The US delegate, Mitchell’s speech is a good summary of the UN’s concerns; but it was overshadowed by Truman’s fated new conference later that day. (Comment: The author should make clear that it was clever maneuvering by Secretary of State Dean Acheson who outgamed the Chinese in those dark days. Gambling they would reject any UN proposal, Acheson crafted a document giving the Chinese almost everything they wanted: talks on Taiwan, US forces in Japan, the whole shebang. He won his gamble: the Chinese rejected it, and an exasperated UN condemned China as the Korean aggressor).
Nowhere is the relentless pace of this book more evident than the discussion of the rout of UN forces in north Korea. Good discussion of Chinese tactics in trapping their enemy in the numerous passes and defiles near Kunu-ri. At the Chosin, Catchpoole makes clear that Task Force Drysdale failed because tanks were used as an armored spearhead, rather than scattered thru the doomed column of soft-walled vehicles. Task force Faith—who’s sad story merited a whole book by Applman—is dusted off in two paragraphs.
The declaration of national emergency at the end of 1950 marked the end of the post WWII military climbdown. Again, the author could have added that this doomed Stalin’s plan for general war in Europe beginning in 1957. In the field, British troops were aghast at the bugout fever then rampant, with UN forces retreating without an enemy in sight; the Royal Ulster Rifles kicked ass! The Brits also plundered abandoned US depots for clothing.
With the passage of time it has become clear that Chipyong-ni was a turning point in the war; when UN forces realized they could hold against severe Chinese pressure, confine the war, work together even if outnumbered. The Chinese failed to attack the weak southern flank; Britain’s Middlesex regiment held in the east, enabling Task Force Crombez to complete the task of saving Chiyong-ni.
Later chapters deal with narrower issues as the crisis went off the boil and into the outpost phase. Successful operations Ripper, Killer—even the dismissal of MacArthur—are treated as ‘just another day’ in this sour war. Catchpoole has chapters about the psywar, attacking hydroelectric plants, and life on the lines. The patrol war bored US and British readers. Though dramatic stands like the ‘Glorious Glosters’ commanded first page renditions, most of the war was relegated to back pages. He does mention that the ‘Hook’ battles made clear the need to hold strategic locations on the Line; nothing is said about the Marines’ conclusion that the bloody Hook battles could have been avoided if ammunition supplies had not been rationed that fall of 1952. Catchpoole’s discussion of the POW issue is factual but seldom delves into the moral issues of repatriation; he could have at least mentioned that Turner Joy, the UN negotiator at the Panmunjom talks, felt the issue should have been discussed after the cease fire, not before. Both China and the US found the respective peninsular leaders, Sygman Rhee and Kim Il Sung, to be ideological pains-in-the-ass as the talks proceeded.
Australia’s leadership role in the Pacific—most recently on display in East Timor—dates back to the Korean War; so America was no the only nation to use the early 1950s as a buildup so they could be a bulwark for world and regional stability.
No book is perfect; but Catchpoole’s has the unfortunate event of making a grievous oversight in the final chapter, where he talks about the impact of the war on Japan, USA, China, Britain and Korea. Japan benefited economically (companies like SONY and Toyota have their roots in this era) as well as becoming a firm anchor for western interests in Asia. The USA saw the birth of cold war politics and emergence of the military/industrial complex. China emerged as a world power but with deep disappointment over Mao’s dictum that hordes of Chinese could match UN armaments. Britain maintained its special relationship with the US; though perhaps second fiddle, it cemented America’s commitment to Europe. Finally, Korea itself: devastated north and south, millions dead and displaced. Kim Il Sung implemented a cruel caricature of Communism; the south a cruel caricature of Democracy. A nice summary, though little which is new. But there is one massive oversight: what about the impact on Russia? Many writers (myself included) make the reasonable claim that Russia emerged as the Korean War’s only true victor. The Russians knew they could bog the US down in asian ‘proxy wars’ (Vietnam, anyone?); China and the US drifted apart, not redressed until Nixon’s visit 20 years later. But even the Russians lost some of their gamble: Mao never forgave the rape of Manchuria; North Korea never forgave the failure to deliver armaments and air power. Stalin held the declaring hand, and never used its ‘allies’ as anything other than dummies.