book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis
Problems with Army troop training and command are discussed by many authors and occurred in numerous spots during the first part of the war, until Ridgway whipped the forces into shape and back into fighting mood. Appleman mentions them here, since there were a lot of problems with troop discipline as the breakout proceeded. But he does not make it a big issue, for two reasons. One, its easy to look back and second guess decisions made under such extreme conditions. Second he feels its largely unproductive; we should concentrate on learning from mistakes, not thrashing ourselves because of them.
The first error was moving troops up to the forward positions at Pyongnuri-gang inlet [henceforth, for obvious reasons, the 'inlet'] immediately after the Marines left the position. The 31st RCT mission was to protect the Marines flank on the east side of the reservoir, and army units were rushed to Hagaru-ri pell-mell. Forces in the area must have known plenty of enemy were around-- the Marines had just finished a 5 day battle with the Chinese as they climbed Funchilin Pass. A reconnaisance platoon sent up the Inlet simply disappeared. Given this it was foolish to send troops to the Inlet and beyond until they reached regimental strength. Not only were Army battalions smaller than Marine ones, but the Army personnel were, on balance, less experienced fighters and rifleman than the Marines were. In defense of the much-maligned soldiers Appleman points out that KATUSA's were a much larger portion of the Army's field strength; whereas the Marines used very few and chiefly as interpreters.
Still, it would require a lot of smoke and mirrors to hide all the army's deficiencies which brought on its Chosin disaster. Poor discipline, platoon placement and snoozing soldiers made the confrontation with the Chinese on the night of the 27th worse than it should have been. Even when Faith ordered a consolidation of positions at the Inlet the next day, he still must have been under the impression tank support from his 2nd battalion was on the way, as he merely ordered abandoned vehicles to be disabled...not destroyed. [Logistic bottlenecks, poor discipline, and Chinese control of large sections of the MSR in the vicinity of Funchilin pass meant the 2nd would never arrive.] Ammo drops were in the wrong place or drifted over the Chinese. Communications were so poor that Faith didn't even know he did have tank battalion just a few miles away! Once the breakout began, communication within the column itself was poor or missing as platoons became mixed; some men didn't even know a breakout was taking place. Discipline vanished as more officers and NCOs were killed or wounded.
All these problems and others will fit in the readers mind better if you turn to chapter 22 near the books end--"Could Task Force Faith Have Been Saved?"-- where Appleman summarizes many of the problems the 31st RCT suffered. Appleman lays out eight factors which doomed the effort. Of these, the crucial command blunder was the withdrawal of the 31st Tank company (the one Faith couldn't talk to!) from Hudong-ni, just 4 miles to the south, the day before the breakout. "In the end," sighs Appleman, "this doomed Task Force Faith." Other blunders are smaller but still incomprehensible: the failure to have a backup plan in the event the road convoy stalled, for example.
Interestingly, Knox's 1st book includes many first-person accounts of the attack, consolidation, convoy and escapes over the ice. Only two of them appear in Appleman's book: USMC Captain Stanford, who was the forward air controller, and Sergeant Chester Bair, with the convoy as a mechanic. Perhaps--and this is pure speculation on my part-- the many others in Knox's book were among those who slipped away prematurely on hill 1221 and over the ice. If they declined comment because they thought Appleman (or anyone else) would be judgemental they would be mistaken.
Appleman does make clear that, despite common belief, a relief tank/infantry relief force did not leave Hagaru-ri on the morning of December 2 in an attempt to rescue the convoy. In agonizing detail the author makes clear that a preliminary Marine order was never issued in final form, partly because of some discussion over the size of the accompanying infantry force. This mistaken belief is probably because readers confuse this relief force, never sent, with the tank battalion at Hodong-ni, withdrawn on November 30th.