Roughstuff's Korean War Archive
book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis
Korea: The First War We Lost by Bevin Alexander
MY GOODNESS, I HAVE JUST read three good military books in a row. Completing the hat trick is Alexander's book. Don't judge the book by its title: there is a fair compendium of the facts (and fantasies) of all the Korean War participants: China, Russia, NKPA and ROK forces, the UN, the US and affiliated armies all swung from victory to defeat; wild bouts of optimism and valleys of despair. Perhaps it is fitting that this country of Morning Calm and intense moods; of vertical ridges and sprawling mud flats, should so condemn those who set foot on its rich and fragrant soils. Do not make Alexander's book the first book you read about the Korean War. Read Appleman, Knox and perhaps Acheson first. Then Alexander's mastery of the war and its complex web of intrigue (NY to Seoul; Beijing to Moscow; London to Delhi) in the high courts of the nascent cold war will hit you hardest where it should: right in the heart. When you count the staggering loss of life-especially in the two years the negotiations dragged on, a delay Alexander rightly blames largely on the USA-and realize they were spent to capture worthless ridges, I doubt tears won't come to your eyes. What a pathetic account Truman and Acheson make of themselves, even if many decisions they reached had merit.
Alexander does so many things well it is best just to list them:
- The chapters are short. You are not afraid to pick the book up because you know you can put it down fairly soon if ya have to. The book follows Appleman's accounts closely, but is more compact. But the chapters are not sound bites. There is enough material to follow the action, IF you have read some other Korean War books first.
- Few books mix politics with military analysis. Even fewer do it well, and Alexander's is one of them. He breaks the diplomatic/political initiatives into tangible issues. While intelligent and analytic, he remains youthful in his comments: "One can only imagine the dispatches that transpired between Moscow and Ambassador Jacob Malik!" The Russian diplomat's vacant chair at the Security Council meeting is a Korean War icon. To right wingers, a metaphor for what communist state-ism would always be: empty.
Even better, he makes it clear that US obsession with victory at all costs with Japan enabled Russia to enter the Asian theater in WWII: the dark seed which led to Soviet occupation north of the 38th parallel and all the evil which followed. Everyone knew we won the war, then lost the peace in Europe: little did we realize in the euphoria of those VJ parades we had fumbled the ball in Asia as well.
- Maps! Maps! At last maps aligned closely with the text, and not photocopied contour maps, but useful sketches showing terrain and troop layouts. The maps could be bigger, but I'd rather see the paper covered with Alexander's writing. The maps enable him to point out crucial turning points-- for example, ROK forces neglected the Pochon road in the war's first hours; or explain final outcomes-as when the failure to take Sobaksan doomed UN offensives west of Masan.
- There is good coverage of the NKPA campaigns in southwest Korea and on its east coast. If the NKPA had not spent weeks watching these ports for potential landings they would easily reached Pusan and crushed the weak defenses there. Ditto for the east coast road: but the troops deployed into the mountains (which descend right to the coast in this part of Korea: the coast road from the DMZ to Pohang is a windy, beautiful bicycle ride.) to prevent ambushes that never came. Alexander might have added that UN delaying forces never really HAD a left flank: the line just petered out in the boggy west country, dictated by platoon counts and weapon availability. NKPA forces entered Kunsan opposed mainly by its police force!
Now sorry but as a reviewer I have some weaknesses to point out. They center around his In'chon analyses. He never makes it clear that an In'chon landing was well known to both Friend and Foe long before it actually occurred. Pyongyang ignored the warnings
because they hoped to capture Pusan first and the win the war: Une Guerre Coree fait accompli.
Alexander also argues the NKPA forgot that even if Pusan did fall, Korea was still a peninsula and their forces would always be vulnerable to an amphibious landing. If so, why all the hysteria about a Pusan perimeter? Put everyone on ships. Shell, mortar and bomb the peninsula into submission or make forays from ports on either coast. In'chon was a success of timing (since most of the NKPA would be trapped in the South), not just locational brilliance.
Alexander's argument also ignores the fact that Korea ceases to be a peninsula as soon as you get north of the 'waist' of Korea, straight across the peninsula from Hungnam. This is exactly where UN forces fell prey to counterattacks by the Chinese. Had UN forces stopped at this line-or not abandoned the north pell-mell in the rout later in 1950-the outcome of the war and any negotiations could have been much different. For more on this see my Korean War FAQ's.
At other times the author shines the In'chon star a bit too much. Not enough is made of the marines suggested landing at Pus'yon...a bit further south but with Seoul still well within reach. The success at In'chon is a good example of the principle (now a firm part of Marine combat doctrine) that a decision doesn't have to be the best-- just firmly and resolutely executed-- to be successful. He also hone's McArthur's debate skills too much (so have I elsewhere on this site): given the squishyness of the joint chiefs, McArthur could have convinced them to land at Dandong if he put his mind to it.
Finally, how crossing the 38th parallel counts as aggression by the US forces has always escaped me. But to Alexander it is a mantra. I might add that if the crossing was by UN forces, its UN, not US, aggression. All part of the obsession in some diplomatic and political circles to give the UN credit for successes but blame failures on the US. We'll see the same thing in the Balkans...let the quagmire deepen, and see how long it is before the US gets all the blame.
Review continues, more text will be added in the near future
Now that you have read the review...
- Like this book?
order it online from AmazonDotCom. This is a direct link to the book.
- Have you already read this book? Wanna post a review of your own? Send me an email and see your review right up here with Roughie's.
- Questions about the issues/topics in this book? Send them to the webmaster and i'll answer your inquiry here, too.
- Return to Roughstuff's Korean War webpage.
- Go all the way back to Roughie's Home Page: Korean War Archive and World Cycle Tour Network.