book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis
"so great was McArthur's luck [at Inchon] that typhoon Kieza... veered off to the east and communist spies were unable to put word thru to North Korea"Oh come on! Operation 'Common Knowledge' had even been featured in the NY Times a few weeks before!
In any case Acheson starts the book with a solid discussion of Korea's history as a pawn of its neighbors: Japan, Russia and China. He maps out the rapid deterioration of relations with Russia after WWII to make clear to the reader the tensions prevalent in postwar Europe and Asia. Also gripping are his accounts of the hectic first week of the war, with the State and Defense departments swinging into action. He never deals with the issue of why, suddenly, the JCS and Truman decided to draw the line in Korea when only a few months before, they felt it was unnecessary. His argument that 'debate about a Declaration of War' would have done harm that desparate summer of 1950, seems specious given that the very issues such a debate would have resolved, soon were bloody blunders on the battlefield: crossing the 38th parallel; advancing to the Yalu; repatriation of prisoners. Modern readers, jaded with Vietnam as well as Korea, are likely to scoff at Acheson's puffery about 'the Presidency as a Sacred Trust:' it was Truman's obligation to hand it to future presidents with its 'powers untrammeled and weakened.' And what powers might those be, oh mighty ur-Secretary of State? Why, the power to send forces without congressional approval!
Acheson is strongest when he recalls events, rather than tries to interpret them. British and Indian initiatives were often comical. The early defeats focused attention on the sad state of our forces and led to almost panic-effort to rebuild our military readiness. Acheson admits, in a rare moment of humility, that the president's civilian and military advisors knew something was badly wrong in November 1950 but 'failed to serve him as he needed to be served." they should have suggested, even ordered, a withdrawal to the Pyongynang/Wonsan waist. They hesitated however, to tamper with a tradition since 1864, of not meddling with the theater commander.
Chinese intervention brought understandable panic and despair; but McArthur's tantrums and moods certainly did not help matters. Acheson states three 'fronts' had to be stabilized.