Another piece of eidence that the North launched the fight is far more convincing. Stalin and Kim-il-sung agreed on a time and date for the attack, months earlier in a meeting in Khabarovsk, Russian far east. Mr. Sung did not know that the clever Stalin planned to use his forces as the cannon fodder in a proxy war to tie down the USA in Asia. But then again, the Chinese did not know either.
(2). Was Acheson's speech about 'Korea being outside the sphere of American influence" an important factor in tipping the scales toward war? Fault the secretary of State for poor timing, but it was nothing more than a statement of prevailing US policy. The "Acheson Line" extended down the Aleutians, skirted the the Russian Islands off the Khamchatka peninsula, between Korea and the Japanese islands, then down the Ryukus and exclduing Taiwan, to the Phillipines. This is partly in accord with the desire of the JCS not to get bogged down 'in a war on the asian mainland.' The NKPA attack was not motivated by the spech. Instead it was motivated by the prospect of a quick and esy victory. When Stalin (see question above) asked Kim il Sung about the possibility America would intervene after the NJPA attacked, the Dear Leader assured him the war would be over by the time the US governmental machinery was ale to grind into the war. The NKPA miscalculated; Stalin did not.
Now the key to understanding this in a more meaningful way is to look closely at this issue of being bogged down on the mainland. On its face the statement is worthless...one does not want to get bogged down in a war anywhere...let alone asia! More precisely the statement by the JCS should be read for what it means..which is If we get involved in a mainland asia war, we will bog down quickly. [Vietnam, anyone?] How does this relate to Korea? Simple: once the UN broke out of the Pusan perimeter, they had mastery of the terrain and the initiative until the arrived north of the 'waist' of korea..noth of Wonsan where the country and front abruptly widens. North of this point Korea ceases to be a peninsula and becomes the Asian mainland. Everone says we bogged down and lost the initiative because of the Chinese intervention. But in that desolate northern terrain, it was only a matter of time before we fell prey to attacks from the central mountains, unless we were willing to commit a far greater quantity of forces, which we were loathe to do even amidst the thrill of victory. It is often overlooked that even after the In'chon landing UN forces were driven batty by guerrilla forces in the Southern highlands. The northern highlands were even worse. If the UN had ceased operations at the waist, without sending hopelessly overexposed probes to the Yalu on several fronts, they would have had a defensible line across the country (admittedly vulnerable in the highest part of the central mountains) when the finally met chinese forces.
Acheson's and Truman's response caught the NKPA completely off guard; even so, they almost won the gamble. Take away the Marines at obong-ni Ridge (TWICE!) and Masan and Pusan would have fallen by mid August.
3. How much of the early defeats by UN forces were due to the military drawdown? How much by blunderous command decisions? For the sake of argument I will say 50-50 split and leave it at that. Clearly the drawdown--Pillsbury doughboy forces and leaders; Beetle Bailey training regimens; obsolete, ineffective weapons-- was a key factor in the eary rout. Bugouts reflected lack of discipline at all levels. But command decisions also play a part. In no part of my reading in these numerous texts do I get the impression that UN (American) forces were made aware that theirs was a delaying action; rather than a (constantly failing) attempt to hold the Communists: at Pyongtaek..Chonan..Taejon... It should have been obvious from the start that there were serious breaches in intelligence due to spies (American artillery batteries were constantly knocked out by accurate fire since their positions were well known). It was blunderous command decisions: lack of field awareness, to be specific-- which led to UN forces constant encirclement and cutoff.
4.Can you briefly summarize the risks and impact of the Inchon landing? The risks were great, especially those imposed by the tides and Flying Fish Channel quirks. But McArthur did have reliable intelligence suggesting the port was poorly defended. It was brilliant to foresee the psychological, propoganda and logistic nightmare for the Communists from losing Seoul. Attacks further south [e.g. Kunsan] might have bogged US forces in the same morass NK troops got themselves into in Korea's southwest. Nor would the envelopment have been as complete. But for Inchon the the best we could have hoped for was a perpetual DMZ at the Pusan Perimeter.
A case can be made for the Marine argument that landing at Pus'yon, 30 miles south of Seoul and a much safer port, would have had all the advantages of Inchon with none of the risks of tides and seawalls. Though further from Seoul, the terrain is not difficult and reaching the Capital might have been just as swift. Also, the In'chon landings were so far behind the enemy that many of the NKPA just vanished into the surrounding villages and countryside to pose a threat as guerillas.
It is true In'chon was followed by arrogance and overconfidence on the part of UN forces but these are not legitimate criticisms of the landing itself
5.Should UN forces have crossed the 38th parallel? Unquestionably. For both military and moral reasons. Morally it was justified to punish the aggressors and destroy their ability to wage war in the future. Militarily it was justified by our superior strategic advantage over the enemy at the time. It is important to realize that 'the 38th parallel' was a political line of demarcation, not a military one. It made almost no sense on the ground; slicing across ridges and mountains without regard for what was a defensible terrain. It is a classic example of what happens when politicians, not military people, make decisions about military matters. [deadly addendum: a similar thing is happening in Bosnia and Israel's 'west bank'. Pantywaists and armchair experts like Bill Clinton are deciding , thousands of miles away, where borders should be drawn and forces should be placed.]
6.Should UN forces have {tried to} advance to the Yalu and liberate all of North Korea? This question has a political aspect and a strategic one. Strategically, advancing to the Yalu made no sense whatsoever whether or not the Chinese intervened. A good summary reason for this? Once you proceed north of the Pyongyang/Wonsan line, Korea ceases to be a peninsula.[see above about this same issue] The front broadens, doubling in width abruptly. Furthermore, the mountainous terrain wipes out what advantage the UN forces had. Chinese intervention hastened the inevitable: road and tank bound forces were pummeled by armies that new the countryside.
Politically advancing to the Yalu was risky but was poorly handled. Had UN/US decisionmakers took the likelihood of Chinese intervention seriously, they could have made a more sincere diplomatic effort to convince the Chinese they had no designs on Manchuria or larger Asian aims (such as Formosa). If it was so obvious to the Russians the US wanted limited war in Korea, why could it not be made clear to the Chinese?
7.Were we correct to put prisoner repatriation into the issues negotaited at Panmunjom? No. I agree with Admiral Turner Joy: an armistice is a military document, not a political one. For US forces to freeze and die in camp 5 while Yahoos like Dodd played pattie-cake with communists in Koje is absurd. It is true that handing soldiers back to communist overlords for slaughter (as happened after WWII) is a nightmare. All the more reason for such persons to oppose communism/Stalinism in their own countries to begin with. If they want to defect, let them please defect BEFORE they go to war with the US...not after. OK ?
8.What is meant by Sanctuaries? What roles did the play in the War? Well, supposedly Manchuria was a sanctuary for MiGs and Pusan was a santuary for UN Naval activity. This meant these sites were 'off limits' to enemy activity for the purpose of 'limiting the war.' But these ideas are pushed too far by civilians and diplomats who have a hackneyed concept of war. North Korea couldn't bomb Pusan even if they wanted: they had no air force after the war's first few weeks. Perhaps Russia could with their MiGs. But it was in Russia's best interest for Korea to become a festering sore between the US and China: accordingly, Russian naval vessels stayed in Vladivostok and their MiGs in North Korea. The 'sanctuaries' were military decisions, not moral ones or the beginning of touchy-feely war. No territory was 'off limits' if striking it served a larger military objective. Thus US Sabres did, eventually, pursue MiGs into Manchurian skies. The role of sanctuaries is overstated and misunderstood.
9.Did anyone win the War? Did anyone lose? Yes. The Russians won. They succeeded in estranging US/China relations for several decades, until Nixon repaired relations in 1972. The losers were those who participated in the War directly. Both Korea lost their industrial base and a paltry million soldiers and civilians. South Korea lost any pretense that it was not propped up by US military support. The US lost face in a region critical to Asian stability; and continues to do so. China lost a chance to seize Taiwan, which was on their agenda for that summer of 1950.
10. Did the Korean War teach the Russians anything else?? Yes. They found that by discreetly lurking in the background, financing communist uprisings under the guise of land, political, and economic reform or wars of liberation, they could bleed the US dry in SE Asia. Later they expanded this to Central America. Not until President Reagan replied with US support of counterinsurgency groups (always a source of horror and outrage to the US left) were the tables leveled and did the process come to a stop.
11.Did we ever come close to using Nukes in Korea? In my opinion we never did, despite histrionics in ths House of Commons and at news conferences in late 1950/early 1951. Atomic bombs of that era were good for one and only one thing: obliterating large cities. Korea's large cities were already quite obliterated, thank you. The JCS knew using the bomb would be so ineffective in Korea, that using it would destroy the prestige and intimidation such weapons represented. In fact the JCS knew alot, if only they had the cajones to speak clearly enough during the course of the Korean War.