book reviews and summaries, comments, analysis
The author has a useful summary of events in the war that led up to the crucial battles in Koreas’ interior: the lightning assaults thru Taejon; the Pusan perimeter stand; the surge back north after In’chon; the subsequent collapse and bugout by Army forces after the rout of Chinese intervention. The real key to the tragedy of these many battles is to understand that Army forces often decided to retreat, in haste, and ‘run the gauntlet of enemy fire,’ rather than stand firm in a defensible perimeter and wait for reinforcements (as happened later at Chip’yong-ni) or retreat under fire (as the marines did at Chosin). Coleman leans a lot on Fehrenbach’s book is this summary but it still helps the reader immensely if you are familiar with the details of the June 1950-January 1951 period.
When the story begins on the Twin Tunnels attack, you see some mistakes made: an attack on the village which betrays to the Chinese US intentions. A fortuitous break in the weather and combat savvy Marine and Air Force fighter bombers saved the day; but it was an important first stand by 8th Army vs. the Chinese.
The launch of Roundup, however, was flawed. ROK forces had command of US units; individual outposts were ‘bubbles’ and had little communication with one another. An unfortunate foreward placement of the SF21 enabled Red forces to capture, and bottleneck, a key bridge. US intelligence should have suspected that the Chinese would, ‘as they did at Kunu-ri, return to Chip’yong-ni.’ Thus what was expected to be a light probe forward turned into a major battle as UN forces were routed. Both sides began to focus on the importance of Wonju, a bombed out but vital crossroads town. Quoting Russell Spurr in his text, the Chinese felt that a breakthrough at Wonju would push Red forces all the way to Taegu. 8th Army, as Ridgway found out to his consternation shortly after, already had grand plans for a retreat to the Pusan perimeter if the Wonju salient fell. Army commanders mumbled about ‘wrong way Ridgway’ when he made it clear to them he was going to whip their forces into offensive shape.
Like Gettysburg, the Wonju battles began poorly for US forces. Almond’s micromanagement, ego, meddling, racism, and vindictiveness (Coleman likes the guy, right?) doomed the early phases of Roundup. The retreat from Changbong-ni (don’t you just love these Korean names?), the failed rescue effort, the valley of death: it all sounds so familiar to Task force Faith, the failed relief effort from Hagaru-ri, hellfire valley north of Koto. Doesn’t X corps ever learn?
Well, yes they did. The first battle of Chip’yong-ni saw US forces cut off. But there was no retreat; platoons kept up covering fire, and booby traps confused Chinese soldiers. Task Force Crombez brought relief. Coleman (and many others) questioned it tactics: tanks abandoned accompanying infantry; VT fuses used on the way south to clear off Chinese soldiers could have been used on the way north; Crombez’ arrogance prompted commander Treacy to bring formal charges against him. But for the actions of driver Calhoun in the 4th tank at a choke point 1 mile south of the perimeter, the force would never had made it. Crombez got a star, but his career was finished after Korea.
At Wonju, the aggressive tactics of the 187th RCT, better weather, a massive artillery barrage and aerial resupply crushed the Chinese. Captured documents revealed later that the Chinese had simply expected the UN forces to bug out after the earlier rout near Chang’bong-ni. Furthermore, the crucial Chinese weakness came to haunt them: lack of flexibility, and communications once a battle began.
Overall, a good book. Just don’t read it first.